In a judgment issued yesterday (Francis v Gross [2024] NZCA 528), the Court of Appeal unanimously overturned the controversial High Court decision in Francis v Gross [2023] NZHC 1107 and held that purchasers of partly constructed modular buildings (pods) did not have equitable liens (at all, and especially not in priority to secured creditors) over those pods.

Two recent cases out of the Third Circuit and the Southern District of New York highlight some of the developing formulas US courts are using when engaging with foreign debtors. In a case out of the Third Circuit, Vertivv. Wayne Burt, the court expanded on factors to be considered when deciding whether international comity requires the dismissal of US civil claims that impact foreign insolvency proceedings.

When a majority of a company’s board approves a tender offer in good faith, can it still be avoided as an actually fraudulent transfer? Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, holding that the fraudulent intent of a corporation’s CEO who was a board member and exercised control over the board can be imputed to the corporation, even if he was the sole actor with fraudulent intent.

Background

This morning, after much anticipation, the Supreme Court has released its judgment in Yan v Mainzeal Property Construction Limited (in liq) [2023] NZSC 113, largely upholding the Court of Appeal's decision, and awarding damages of $39.8m against the directors collectively, with specified limits for certain directors. The decision signals that a strong emphasis on 'creditor protection' is now embedded in New Zealand company law.

Recently, in In re Moon Group Inc., a bankruptcy court said no, but the district court, which has agreed to review the decision on an interlocutory appeal, seems far less sure.

In recent years much ink has been spilled opining on the so called 'Quincecare' duty of care, and the limits of it (see links to our recent insolvency law updates covering the topic below). The judgment in Barclays Bank plc v Quincecare Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 363 was a first instance decision on Steyn J, in which he found that a bank has a duty not to execute a payment instruction given by an agent of its customer without making inquiries if the bank has reasonable grounds for believing that the agent is attempting to defraud the customer.

Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in the case of CII Parent, Inc., cementing the advice routinely given by bankruptcy counsel to borrowers in default. We always counsel borrower clients in default of the risk associated with lenders taking unilateral actions pre-filing, stripping debtors of valuable options and assets. Thus, we normally recommend to always obtain a forbearance and undertake the preparations required to file a bankruptcy petition immediately upon forbearance termination, although whether or not to file depends on variety of factors that should be considered.

The Second Circuit recently held that a non-party to an assumed executory contract is not entitled to a cure payment (although it may be so entitled if is a third-party beneficiary of the contract). The result would have seemed obvious to bankruptcy practitioners. So, what in the world made the party pursuing payment take this to the Second Circuit? Well, surprisingly, as the Second Circuit decision shows, the answer is not found in the plain text of the Bankruptcy Code. And while it was argued prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, 598 U.S.

A mortgage loan repurchase facility (more casually referred to as a "repo") is a financing structure commonly utilized to finance mortgage loans. These facilities are utilized by both residential and commercial mortgage loan originators and aggregators to finance mortgage loans that they originate or acquire. The structure is favored by liquidity providers in the mortgage loan finance arena due to its preferential "safe harbor" treatment under the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), as further described below.

Lenders often attempt to limit what a borrower can do outside the ordinary course of business by negotiating contractual protections. Some of these provisions are designed to make the borrowers bankruptcy remote by, for example, requiring the borrower’s Board to include an independent director whose consent is required for a bankruptcy filing. Others, as was the case we discuss here, however, go further by including contractual rights that limit a borrower’s ability to file for bankruptcy without the lender’s consent.