The English Court of Appeal has recently decided that a corporation that held shares in a company remained a shareholder notwithstanding the shareholding company's dissolution.
BWE Estates Limited had two shareholders: an individual named David who held 75% of its shares and a company, Belvedere Limited, which held the remaining 25%. Although Belvedere was dissolved in 1996, it remained listed as a shareholder in BWE's share register.
In the English High Court, the joint administrators of four English companies within the former Lehman Brothers group sought directions from the Court in respect of a proposed settlement. The settlement would put to rest substantial inter-company claims including those at issue in the 'Waterfall III' proceedings.
In a second application heard on the same day, Hildyard J considered an application by the administrators of Lehman Brothers Europe Limited (LBEL) for directions that would enable a surplus to be distributed to the sole member of LBEL while LBEL remained in administration. The proposed scheme had material benefits for both shareholders and creditors. The administrators acknowledged that the orders sought were an indirect means of circumventing the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), which does not expressly provide for directors to make distributions during an administration.
The Court of Appeal has recently dismissed an appeal from the High Court's judgment (discussed in our September 2016 update) setting aside a compromise under Part 14 of the Companies Act 1993 after finding that the challenging creditors, who had voted against the compromise, had been unfairly prejudiced by the decision to call only one meeting of creditors.
In Day v The Official Assignee as Liquidator of GN Networks Ltd (in Liq) [2016] NZHC 2400, the High Court rejected a claim that the funding arrangement at issue constituted maintenance or champerty.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on May 4, 2015, affirmed U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain’s decision confirming the reorganization plan for Momentive Performance Materials Inc. and its affiliated debtors.1 The Bankruptcy Court’s decision was controversial because it forced the debtors’ senior secured creditors to accept new secured notes bearing interest at below- market rates.
On Sept. 12, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision to deny payment of a make-whole premium (the “Make-Whole Amount”) to bondholders under three separate indentures (the “Indentures”) based on the plain language of those agreements. U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n v. AMR Corp. et al. (In re AMR Corp.), __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 4840474 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 2013) (“In re AMR Corp. II”).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on Feb. 14, 2013, held that an insider of a Chapter 11 partnership debtor cannot avoid the “competition rule” in a new-value reorganization plan. The debtor’s equity owner arranged for his wife, also an “insider,” to contribute new value to obtain the equity of the reorganized debtor. In re Castleton Plaza, LP, — F.3d –––, 2013 WL 537269 at *1 (7th Cir., Feb. 14, 2013).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held on Aug. 3, 2012, that equitable considerations could not prevent a creditor's recouping amounts owed to it by a chapter 7 debtor. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 2012 WL 3139364, *4 (8th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012). Reversing the bankruptcy court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP"), the Eighth Circuit explained that "once a party meets the same-transaction test . . . a court should not impose an additional 'balancing of the equities' requirement" on the doctrine of recoupment. Id.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that a debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lender had breached its financing agreement, barring its claim for commitment and funding fees from the DIP. Arlington LF, LLC v. Arlington Hospitality, Inc., No. 09-3560, 2011 WL 727981, *9 (7th Cir. March 3, 2011), aff’g No. 08 C 5098, 2011 WL 3055350 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009). Although the DIP itself had also breached the agreement, that breach was not, in the court’s view, effective until after the lender had already “walked away.” Id. at *6.