The English Court of Appeal has recently decided that a corporation that held shares in a company remained a shareholder notwithstanding the shareholding company's dissolution.

BWE Estates Limited had two shareholders: an individual named David who held 75% of its shares and a company, Belvedere Limited, which held the remaining 25%. Although Belvedere was dissolved in 1996, it remained listed as a shareholder in BWE's share register.

In the English High Court, the joint administrators of four English companies within the former Lehman Brothers group sought directions from the Court in respect of a proposed settlement. The settlement would put to rest substantial inter-company claims including those at issue in the 'Waterfall III' proceedings.

In a second application heard on the same day, Hildyard J considered an application by the administrators of Lehman Brothers Europe Limited (LBEL) for directions that would enable a surplus to be distributed to the sole member of LBEL while LBEL remained in administration. The proposed scheme had material benefits for both shareholders and creditors. The administrators acknowledged that the orders sought were an indirect means of circumventing the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), which does not expressly provide for directors to make distributions during an administration.

The Court of Appeal has recently dismissed an appeal from the High Court's judgment (discussed in our September 2016 update) setting aside a compromise under Part 14 of the Companies Act 1993 after finding that the challenging creditors, who had voted against the compromise, had been unfairly prejudiced by the decision to call only one meeting of creditors.

In Day v The Official Assignee as Liquidator of GN Networks Ltd (in Liq) [2016] NZHC 2400, the High Court rejected a claim that the funding arrangement at issue constituted maintenance or champerty.

Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(10) provides that in order for a plan proponent to “cram down” - i.e., force acceptance of - a plan of reorganization on a dissenting class of creditors, at least one impaired class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. Because a plan is often not accepted by all classes entitled to vote, the ability to procure at least one impaired, accepting class in order to cram down a dissenting class is essential in achieving plan confirmation.

On January 31, 2013, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC¹ declined to designate the votes of parties to a post-petition restructuring support agreement (i.e., a lock-up agreement), instead confirming the Debtors’ Modified Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization (the “Plan”) based on the votes of such parties.