In March, we reported on a brief filed by the Solicitor General recommending denial of a petition for certiorari filed by Tribune creditors seeking Supreme Court review of the Second Circuit ruling dismissing their state-law fraudulent transfer claims.

A discharge of debt in bankruptcy “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). Certain debts, however, including debts “for violation of . . . any of the State securities laws,” are not subject to discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). A discharge injunction does not bar the collection of such debts.

This update deals with the significant appeal judgment released yesterday by the Court of Appeal in the proceedings brought by the liquidators of Mainzeal Property and Construction Ltd (in Liq) (Mainzeal) against its directors. Our previous legal updates on the High Court decisions can be found here and here.

The real lesson from Debut Homes – don't stiff the tax (wo)man

The Supreme Court has overturned the 2019 Court of Appeal decision Cooper v Debut Homes Limited (in liquidation) [2019] NZCA 39 and restored the orders made by the earlier High Court decision, reminding directors that the broad duties under the Companies Act require consideration of the interests of all creditors, and not just a select group. This is the first time New Zealand’s highest court has considered sections 131, 135 and 136 of the Companies Act, making this a significant decision.

We have blogged previously about section 546(e), the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor for certain transfers otherwise subject to avoidance as preferences or fraudulent transfers. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e). Among the transfers protected by the section 546(e) safe harbor are transfers by or to a “financial participant” made “in connection with a securities contract.” Id.

The Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. These avoidance powers are subject to certain limitations, including a safe harbor in section 546(e) exempting certain transfers. Among other things, section 546(e) bars avoidance of a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . .

Last February, we blogged about the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Energy Future Holdings Corp, No. 19-1430, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4947 (Feb. 18, 2020). The Third Circuit approved a process for resolving asbestos claims in which a bar date was imposed on filing the claims, but late claimants who were unaware of their asbestos claims would be allowed to have the bar date excused through Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3). (A bar date is a date set by the court by which all claims against the debtor must be filed.

Five years after it refused to pay rent and took the landlord to the High Court, and two years after it was placed into liquidation on account of unpaid rent, the final branch of litigation brought by the directors of Oceanic Palms Limited (in liq) has been cut down by the Supreme Court.

The UK Supreme Court in Bresco Electrical Services Ltd (in liq) v Michael J Lonsdale (Electrical Ltd) [2020] UKSC 25 has decided that the adjudication regime for building disputes is not incompatible with the insolvency process.

In the two judgments, Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Salus Safety Equipment Ltd (in liq) [2020] NZHC 1368 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v Green Securities Ltd (in liq) [2020] NZHC 1371, Associate Judge Bell significantly reduced the amount recoverable in each proceeding by liquidators. 

Both cases considered applications from liquidators to seek approval of their remuneration.  In Salus the amount claimed was $91,600 and in Green Securities it was $159,044.