Deep Purple was, and still is, a rock music band. Its members included Mr Gillan, Mr Glover and Mr Paice. In 2005, band members entered into an agreement with HEC Enterprises Limited (HEC) and Deep Purple (Overseas) Limited (DPO). Under that agreement, the parties agreed to form a new company named Purpletuity, to which various copyrights and other assets were to be transferred. In 2015, Mr Gillan, Mr Glover and Mr Paice commenced proceedings against HEC and DPO to enforce that agreement.

In Mclean v Trustees of the Bankruptcy Estate of Dent [2016] EWHC 2650, the High Court considered the application of the equitable doctrines of marshalling and subrogation in relation to a fixed charge over (among other things) a dog.

A company and partnership borrowed funds from two sources – Barclays Bank and Lady Morrison. Barclays held, among other things, charges over farms owned by individual partners and an agricultural charge under the Agricultural Credits Act 1928 (UK), including a charge over a dog. Lady Morrison only held charges over the farms.

In Day v The Official Assignee as Liquidator of GN Networks Ltd (in Liq) [2016] NZHC 2400, the High Court rejected a claim that the funding arrangement at issue constituted maintenance or champerty.

A Chapter 11 debtor’s reorganization plan purporting to cure a default under a pre-bankruptcy loan agreement must pay “the agreed-upon default rate interest,” consistent with “the underlying agreement” and the “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on Aug. 31, 2015. In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 2015 WL 5091909, at *4 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2015).

Is market value sufficient proof of reasonably equivalent value for purposes of the good-faith-for-value defense under Texas law? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified that question to the Texas Supreme Court on June 30, 2015, after vacating its earlier decision in Janvey v. The Golf Channel, Inc., 2015 WL 3972216, at *3 (5th Cir. June 30, 2015).

Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.