In a recent decision, the Federal Court of Australia declined to annul a bankruptcy in circumstances where the bankrupt claimed the proceedings should have been adjourned given his incarceration and solvency at the time the order was made: Mehajer v Weston in his Capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Salim Mehajer [2019] FCA 1713. The judgment is useful in reiterating what factors the Court will consider when deciding whether to order an annulment under section 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).

The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment has published a Cabinet Paper outlining proposed reforms to New Zealand's insolvency laws to take account of certain recommendations made in the second report of the Insolvency Working Group from May 2017.

In a recent case, Emmett AJA of the Supreme Court of New South Wales refused to make an order to terminate the winding up of an incorporated association. In this article, we re-examine the principles with which the Court will have regard when determining whether to exercise its discretion to terminate the winding up of a company or incorporated association.

Background

A company’s non-compliance with a statutory demand is the most common method of proving its insolvency in any winding up proceedings. Generally, if it does not make good the debt under the statutory demand within 21 days of service, the company will be presumed to be insolvent. What can a company do if it disputes the legitimacy of the debt?

The basics – compulsory winding up and statutory demands

The Limitations Act 1969 (NSW) (Limitations Act) establishes time limits within which plaintiffs must commence civil proceedings, including for the recovery of a debt. A failure to bring a claim within the relevant time period results in the claim lapsing, and the creditor losing its rights to enforce its debt. Accordingly, it is critical that creditors understand how the law restricts their ability to collect debts and any exceptions that they may rely upon as the limitation date approaches.

On various occasions during the periods 2012 to 2018, Shane Warner Builders Limited (SWBL) regularly failed to pay GST and PAYE to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue.

In January 2018 the Commissioner filed an application to put SWBL into liquidation.  The proceeding was adjourned in March 2018 whilst the Commissioner and Applicant engaged in negotiations for relief which ultimately failed due to SWBL's history of failures to pay tax arrears and failing to provide substantive supporting evidence regarding the source of funds required to settle current tax arrears. 

North Harbour Motors Limited (in liquidation) (North Harbour) issued a statutory demand against Moffat Road Limited (Moffat) in respect of two separate $30,000 deposits paid by North Harbour to Moffat on the purchase of two properties pursuant to agreements for sale and purchase dated 6 July 2015 (the Agreements).

FTG Securities Limited involved an application by FTG Securities Limited (FTG) for declarations as to the interpretation of a Deed of Priority.  The Deed of Priority was entered into by Canterbury Finance Limited (CFL) and a bank with respect to the security interests in Tuam Ventures Limited (in Rec and in Liq) (TVL).  Declaratory relief was sought against the bank and the receivers of TVL.  An issue raised by way of an affirmative defence was whether the assignment of TVL's debt and securities to FTG is valid from a technical legal perspective and therefore wh

In what is likely to be the final chapter in the Ross Asset Management (RAM) liquidation, assuming no appeal is filed, the High Court has considered an application for directions by the liquidators of Ross Asset Management concerning how best to distribute recovered funds.  David Ross operated RAM as a Ponzi scheme for decades until the fraud was uncovered in 2012 and the company went into liquidation.  Mr Ross is currently serving a ten year plus term of imprisonment for his role as architect of the scheme.

In Lafferty v Official Assignee Gordon J considered Mr Lafferty's appeal of two decisions of the Official Assignee to refuse Mr Lafferty's applications under section 62(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1967 to enter or carry on business while bankrupt.

Gordon J dismissed the appeal on the basis that Mr Lafferty could not show that the Official Assignee had made an error of law, failed to take into account relevant considerations or was manifestly wrong in exercising its discretion under regulation 34 of the Insolvency Regulations 1970.