The Insolvency and Company Court of England and Wales recently held in Sell Your Car With Us Ltd v Anil Sareen [2019] EWHC 2332 (Ch) that, when a debtor fails to comply with a statutory demand and has no arguable case to dispute a debt, a winding-up petition (initiation of liquidation proceedings) is appropriate, despite judges previously expressing distaste towards the use of a petition as a method of debt collection.

The High Court in Cullen Group Limited v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2019] NZHC 3110 has rejected Cullen Group's attempt to delay payment of half a million dollars in court costs to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue, with Palmer J dismissing the argument that Cullen Group would go into liquidation as a result.

Eric Watson's private investment company, Cullen Group Limited, lost a case in front of Palmer J in March which held that Cullen Group avoided $51.5m of tax. Cullen Group owed Inland Revenue $505,399.55 in court costs.

Bloomberg reported last month that the Madoff bankruptcy has one more big case to go, chasing USD3.2b held by foreign banks (see our related story above). Mr Picard, the bankruptcy trustee, has reportedly recovered over USD14b of the USD17.5b in losses arising from Madoff's Ponzi scheme.

On 10 October 2019 the Australian Small Business and Family Enterprise Ombudsman, Kate Carnell, announced an upcoming inquiry into insolvency practices. The inquiry was announced in light of rising concerns as to the efficacy of the voluntary administration process for SMEs and family-owned businesses, and concerns with the conduct of insolvency practitioners more generally.

In a recent decision, the Federal Court of Australia declined to annul a bankruptcy in circumstances where the bankrupt claimed the proceedings should have been adjourned given his incarceration and solvency at the time the order was made: Mehajer v Weston in his Capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Salim Mehajer [2019] FCA 1713. The judgment is useful in reiterating what factors the Court will consider when deciding whether to order an annulment under section 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).

Generally, once a company enters into liquidation, litigation against that company cannot be commenced or be continued without the leave of the Court (Corporations Act 2001, s 471B). However, occasionally a liquidator may cause a company to commence or defend litigation after the commencement of the winding up. What happens if the company in liquidation is unsuccessful in that litigation and is subject to an adverse cost order? How will such an adverse cost order rank amongst other competing creditors?

Getting to the top

The Federal Court of Australia recently struck off an insolvency practitioner from the register of liquidators and restrained him for ten years for acting as an insolvency practitioner. The case concerns the conduct of David Iannuzi, who the Court found had "repeatedly fell short of the standards that would ordinarily be expected of him as a competent registered liquidator". The judgment sets out in detail the conduct that the Court found to be unsatisfactory and serves as a reminder of the standards expected of liquidators.

Background

The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment has published a Cabinet Paper outlining proposed reforms to New Zealand's insolvency laws to take account of certain recommendations made in the second report of the Insolvency Working Group from May 2017.

It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?

Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.