In Ebert Construction Ltd v Sanson [2016] NZHC 472, the High Court awarded costs to liquidators after a statutory demand issued by the liquidators had been set aside by consent. The reasons were as follows:
The Supreme Court has recently denied leave to appeal a judgment concerning the application of the continuing business relationship to voidable transactions under section 292(4B) of the Companies Act 1993.
The New Zealand High Court has, in Whittman v UCI Holdings Ltd [2016] NZHC 1228, provided further guidance as to how it will treat applications for interim relief under the Insolvency (Cross-Border) Act 2006 (Act).
In Petterson v Browne [2016] NZCA 189 a liquidator successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal and obtained orders under sections 295 and 299 of the Companies Act 1993 (Act) for certain payments and security to be set aside.
In our June 2015 update we reported on the Court of Appeal decision in which Mr Gilbert was held personally liable for body corporate levies, as a receiver of QSM Trustees Limited (QSMTL). QSMTL owned units in a unit title complex. The Body Corporate sought to exercise its statutory power and impose levies on Mr Gilbert personally, as receiver of QSMTL.
Bankruptcy represents a significant interference with the bankrupt's property and business activities. Those consequences form the judicial policy at work in Re Bartercard Exchange Ltd [2016] NZHC 703, in which the Court refused to cure deficiencies in Bartercard's bankruptcy notice, and dismissed its application to adjudicate Mr de Vires bankrupt.
James Developments Limited (JDL) went into liquidation on 6 July 2009.
In November 2012, the liquidator issued proceedings against a trust for repayment of a loan, six years and one month after the loan was made. The trustees argued the claim was time-barred. The liquidator argued there had been a fraudulent cover-up of the loan and that the High Court should postpone the limitation period under section 28 of the Limitation Act 1950 (Act).
In a June 3, 2016 decision1 , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.
In Shlosberg v Avonwick Holdings Ltd [2016] EWHC 1001 (Ch), Mr Shloesberg applied for an order restraining Dechert (a firm of solicitors) from acting for Avonwick (the first respondent) and Mr Shloesberg's Trustees in bankruptcy (the third respondents).
In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.1