In a June 3, 2016 decision¹ , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.

In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.¹

In a March 29, 2016 decision,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals") held that creditors are preempted from asserting state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbors" that, among other things, exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security (here, in the context of a leveraged buyout ("LBO")), from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.

Following the determination of the substantive High Court case earlier last year (see our previous summary here), this case concerned a dispute in respect of a right to claim int

In Cook v Mortgage Debenture, Mr Cook applied to be joined to a proceeding that was being continued by a claimant company after it had been placed into administration.  The issue was whether the Court's consent was required on the basis that the application was against a company in administration (the English legislation being similar to section 248 of the Companies Act 1993).  The Court concluded that, while the moratorium covered legal proceedings against a company in administration or liquidation, it does not cover defensive steps in proceedings brought (or contin

In Madsen-Ries and Vance v Petera the High Court found that the directors of Petranz Limited (in liquidation) had breached certain directors' duties under the Companies Act and, as a consequence, were liable to pay compensation to the Company.  In particular, the directors failed to keep proper financial records and produce financial statements.

The decision of Graham & Jackson v Arena Capital Limited (In Liquidation) concerned an application under the Companies Act 1993 by liquidators seeking direction on the application of liquidation funds.

A recent interlocutory decision (Action Media Ltd v Mitchell [2015] NZHC 3121) in ongoing litigation between the liquidators and the former director and shareholder of Action Media Ltd (In Liquidation) gives some guidance on the relationship between the liquidators' powers under section 261 of the Companies Act 1993 and their obligations to discover relevant documents under their control.  The defendants had requested discovery from the liquidators of certain correspondence between the liquidators and the IRD, and of pre-liquidation correspondence between the company and

The majority of the Court of Appeal has upheld the High Court decision (see Buddle Findlay's summary here) that the liquidators of Ross Asset Management Limited (RAM) can recover the fictitious profits obtained by Mr McIntosh ($454,047), but not his initial investment ($500,000).

For the first time in New Zealand, the High Court has considered whether a compromise under Part 14 of the Companies Act 1993 can release guarantors of a company's debts.  Silverfern proposed a Part 14 compromise to its creditors and, as part of that compromise, the guarantees given by Silverfern's directors and shareholders, Mr and Mrs O'Connor, of Silverfern's debts, would be unconditionally released.  The compromise was approved by the required majority but opposed by the plaintiffs.