The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment has published a Cabinet Paper outlining proposed reforms to New Zealand's insolvency laws to take account of certain recommendations made in the second report of the Insolvency Working Group from May 2017.
Un accionista solicitó del juzgado mercantil que se acordara la disolución judicial de la compañía en la que participaba (y que se nombrara liquidador a quien ostentaba la condición de administrador) por haberse producido la paralización de los órganos sociales (art. 363.1.d Ley de Sociedades de Capital [LSC]). En el procedimiento no se discutió la realidad de esta paralización, pero se alegó —para oponerse a lo solicitado— que se había incumplido el requisito de la previa convocatoria de junta general extraordinaria.
Se presentó a inscripción en el Registro Mercantil escritura pública de fusión en la que la sociedad absorbente estaba íntegramente participada por la sociedad absorbida (que se encontraba en liquidación). Los acuerdos de fusión fueron adoptados por el socio único de la sociedad absorbente (esto es, por la sociedad absorbida, representada por el liquidador). La registradora denegó la inscripción argumentando, entre otras cosas, que resultaba preciso también el acuerdo de la junta general de la sociedad absorbida.
En su Sentencia de 1 de marzo de 2019 [RJ 2019/622] el Tribunal Supremo ha venido a interpretar la excepción a la subordinación de los créditos de las personas especialmente relacionadas con el concursado que se contiene en el artículo 92.5º de la Ley Concursal (LC).
Las Sentencias del Tribunal Supremo de 10 de julio y 31 de octubre de 2018 [RJ 2018/2814 y RJ 2018/4729] han debido decidir si una sociedad (TIP) ostentaba el control sobre otra (TRECAM) a los efectos de determinar si esta segunda pertenecía al grupo de la socia única (CAM) de la primera (lo que resultaba relevante para la calificación en el concurso de TRECAM de los créditos de CAM y de otra filial íntegramente participada de esta ultima entidad).
On various occasions during the periods 2012 to 2018, Shane Warner Builders Limited (SWBL) regularly failed to pay GST and PAYE to the Commissioner of Inland Revenue.
In January 2018 the Commissioner filed an application to put SWBL into liquidation. The proceeding was adjourned in March 2018 whilst the Commissioner and Applicant engaged in negotiations for relief which ultimately failed due to SWBL's history of failures to pay tax arrears and failing to provide substantive supporting evidence regarding the source of funds required to settle current tax arrears.
North Harbour Motors Limited (in liquidation) (North Harbour) issued a statutory demand against Moffat Road Limited (Moffat) in respect of two separate $30,000 deposits paid by North Harbour to Moffat on the purchase of two properties pursuant to agreements for sale and purchase dated 6 July 2015 (the Agreements).
FTG Securities Limited involved an application by FTG Securities Limited (FTG) for declarations as to the interpretation of a Deed of Priority. The Deed of Priority was entered into by Canterbury Finance Limited (CFL) and a bank with respect to the security interests in Tuam Ventures Limited (in Rec and in Liq) (TVL). Declaratory relief was sought against the bank and the receivers of TVL. An issue raised by way of an affirmative defence was whether the assignment of TVL's debt and securities to FTG is valid from a technical legal perspective and therefore wh
In what is likely to be the final chapter in the Ross Asset Management (RAM) liquidation, assuming no appeal is filed, the High Court has considered an application for directions by the liquidators of Ross Asset Management concerning how best to distribute recovered funds. David Ross operated RAM as a Ponzi scheme for decades until the fraud was uncovered in 2012 and the company went into liquidation. Mr Ross is currently serving a ten year plus term of imprisonment for his role as architect of the scheme.
In Lafferty v Official Assignee Gordon J considered Mr Lafferty's appeal of two decisions of the Official Assignee to refuse Mr Lafferty's applications under section 62(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 1967 to enter or carry on business while bankrupt.
Gordon J dismissed the appeal on the basis that Mr Lafferty could not show that the Official Assignee had made an error of law, failed to take into account relevant considerations or was manifestly wrong in exercising its discretion under regulation 34 of the Insolvency Regulations 1970.