La regla de la que vamos a tratar se formula con diversos nombres, aunque es muy conocida la expresión nemo potest propriam turpitudinem allegareo la denominación de denegatio actionis.

1. Prolegómenos sobre naturaleza del leasing

In a June 3, 2016 decision¹ , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.

In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.¹

La sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de 8 abril 2016 realiza unas interesantes consideraciones sobre la compensación en el concurso.

In a March 29, 2016 decision,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals") held that creditors are preempted from asserting state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbors" that, among other things, exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security (here, in the context of a leveraged buyout ("LBO")), from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.

1. A common problem with re financing arrangements homologated (i.e., sanctioned by a court) pursuant to the 4th additional provision of the Spanish Insolvency Act (abbrev. LCon) is becoming apparent of late where the signatories to such an arrangement undertake to open or keep open lines of credit or otherwise provide the debtor with new resources and, once such arrangement has been homologated, funding needs complementary or different to those contained in the homologated refinancing arrangement arise.

1. Está convirtiéndose en un problema usual en las refinanciaciones homologadas de la disposición adicional cuarta de la Ley Concursal (LCon) en las que los firmantes se comprometen a abrir o a mantener líneas de créditos o de alguna manera a facilitar al deudor recursos nuevos que, obtenida la aprobación judicial, se presenten luego necesidades previstas o imprevistas de financiación suplementaria o distinta de la plasmada en el acuerdo de refinanciación aprobado.

Con la reforma del artículo 90.1.6.º de la Ley Concursal (LCon) dispuesta por la Ley 40/2015 se generalizó un casi entusiasta clamor entre los operadores del sector. Se consideraba que quedaba definitivamente resuelto el perverso historial con- cursal de las prendas sobre créditos futuros. Yo no lo veo tan claro y puedo imaginarme más de un modo por el que un juez concursal averso a este tipo de garantías puede arruinar aquel entusiasmo por vía de una interpretación no totalmente absurda del precepto nuevo.

The amendment to art. 90(1)(6) of the Insolvency Act 22/2003 (abbrev. LCON) by the Public Sector (Legal Regime) Act 40/2015 was welcomed almost enthusiastically by most market agents. It was felt that the inconsistent treatment bestowed on pledges of future claims (hereinafter, ‘PFC’) would finally be a thing of the past. I myself am not altogether convinced that this is the case, being able to envisage more than one way an insolvency judge, averse to this type of security interests, can dampen the aforementioned enthusiasm by way of a not overly absurd interpretation of the new provision.