In a June 3, 2016 decision¹ , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.

On October 7, 2015, the British Columbia Court of Appeal reversed the Supreme Court of British Columbia's decision in Barafield Realty Ltd. v. Just Energy (B.C.) Limited Partnership ["Barafield Realty"].¹ In July of 2014, we wrote the attached bulletin http://www.mcmillan.ca/Assigning-contracts-in-Canadian-insolvency-proceedings on the lower court decision.

As discussed in our May 2016 bulletin, New Rules for Asset Sales by Insolvent Producers (at least for now), the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta in Re Redwater Energy Corporation, 2016 ABQB 278 ("Redwater") determined that provisions of the provincial legislation governing the actions of licensees of oil and gas assets did not apply to receivers and trustees in bankruptcy of insolvent companies, given the paramountcy of the Bank

In Alberta, regulations have historically prohibited purchasers of oil and gas assets from cherry picking operating interests in economic properties while leaving behind interests in uneconomic wells. This has had a significant negative impact on the ability of a receiver or trustee to market and sell assets owned by insolvent companies and on the prices those assets are able to attract.

In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.¹

In a March 29, 2016 decision,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals") held that creditors are preempted from asserting state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbors" that, among other things, exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security (here, in the context of a leveraged buyout ("LBO")), from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.

On January 4, 2016, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) deviated from SDNY precedent and held that, despite the absence of clear Congressional intent, the avoidance powers provided for under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code can be applied extraterritorially. As a result, a fraudulent transfer of property of a debtor’s estate that occurs outside of the United States can be recovered under Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code.

On December 14, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that claims arising from securities of a debtor’s affiliate must be subordinated to all claims or interests senior or equal to claims of the same type as the underlying securities in the bankruptcy proceeding.

On October 28, 2015, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) issued a decision that significantly expands the jurisdictional bases that foreign issuers can rely upon to obtain relief in the United States under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In a blow to the Lehman Chapter 11 estates, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held on September 16, 2015 that Intel Corporation’s Loss calculation resulting from a failed transaction under an ISDA Master Agreement was appropriate.¹ The decision is significant both because of the dearth of judicial interpretation of the ISDA mechanics regarding the calculation of early termination amounts, and because it affirms the general market understanding that a non-defaulting party has broad discretion in calculating “Loss,” so long as its