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Prompted by the EU Restructuring Directive and accelerated by the pandemic, jurisdictions all across Europe have completely transformed their restructuring regimes in recent years. This is part of a global trend towards more debtor-friendly, rescue-orientated restructuring regimes, inspired by US Chapter 11.

On 25 January 2022, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) published draft guidance on how it will approach ‘compromises’ by regulated firms. The guidance is expressed to cover restructuring plans, schemes of arrangement and CVAs.

A new Act, which received Royal Assent on 15 December 2021, extends the existing directors’ disqualification regime to the directors of dissolved companies.

On 28 June 2021, the UK High Court declined to sanction Hurricane Energy Plc’s restructuring plan. This was the first time a restructuring plan seeking to achieve a debt-for-equity swap against the wishes of existing shareholders had come before the court.

Background

A new bill, which the UK Government introduced to Parliament on 12 May 2021, seeks to extend the existing directors’ disqualification regime to the directors of dissolved companies.

Following the judgments in recent years on attribution to a company of its directors' knowledge in Bilta (UK) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Nazir [2015] UKSC 23 and UBS AG (London Branch) and another v Kommunale Wasserwerke Leipzig [2017] EWCA Civ 1567, the UK Supreme Court has once more returned to this issue in Singularis Holdings Ltd (in Official Liquidation) (a Company Incorporated in The Cayman Islands) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Ltd [2019] UKSC 50, in a case where a bank (Daiwa) was held liable for breaching its Quincecare duty of care to its customer,

English courts recognise that shareholders hold a separate legal personality from the body corporate they own a stake in and will only go behind the corporate veil in limited circumstances. In the recent case of Onur Air Taşimacilik AŞ v Goldtrail Travel Ltd (In Liquidation) 1 , the Court of Appeal considered whether the financial means of the appellant’s wealthy controlling shareholder could be taken into account when making an order that the appellant had to make a substantial payment into court as a condition of being able to pursue its appeal.