Once again, we reflect on the prior year for restructuring trends impacting private credit lenders. Last year it was all about “liability management”—the latest trend in which the limits of sponsor-favorable loan documents are being tested, in some cases past the breaking point.

A common yet contentious liability management strategy is an “uptier” transaction, where lenders holding a majority of loans or notes under a financing agreement seek to elevate or “roll-up” the priority of their debt above the previously pari passu debt held by the non-participating minority lenders. In a recent decision in the Boardriders case, the minority lenders defeated a motion to dismiss various claims challenging an uptier transaction.

In an important decision to private credit lenders, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a make-whole premium for an unsecured creditor tied to future interest payments is the “functional equivalent of unmatured interest” and not recoverable under Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Ultra Petroleum Corp. v. Ad Hoc Committee of OpCo Unsecured Creditors (In re Ultra Petroleum Corp.), No. 21-20008 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (“Ultra”). Ordinarily, the story ends here.

Creditors of distressed businesses are often frustrated by shareholder-controlled boards when directors pursue strategies that appear to be designed to benefit shareholders at the creditors’ expense. In these circumstances, creditors might consider sending a letter to the board to convince the directors to pivot and adopt alternative strategies or face risk of liability for breaching fiduciary duties. The efficacy of this approach depends on many factors, including the company’s financial condition, the board’s composition and the underlying transactions at issue.

This past year was marked by extraordinary deal activity. Record breaking M&A activity drove record breaking private credit activity. Private equity M&A activity was at a substantial high, with over 8,500 deals worth $2.1 trillion, a 60% increase over 2020. Not surprisingly, in this environment, defaults were at all-time lows. The Proskauer Private Credit Default tracker showed an active default rate of approximately 1% at the end of 2021, compared to 3.6% in 2020.

Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of a structured dismissal in 2017,[1] there is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The primary investment thesis of a private credit lender is simple — get the loan repaid at maturity. Private credit lenders do not make loans as a means to acquire their borrower’s business. There are circumstances, however, where private credit lenders must be prepared to take ownership when the borrower is distressed and there is no realistic prospect of near-term loan repayment. Becoming the owner of a borrower’s business may very well be the loan recovery option of last resort.

The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 is far-reaching with its implications extending to pension schemes. Pension scheme employers and trustees should ensure that they are familiar with the provisions of the Act, and the potential impact that they could have on schemes, employers and savers.

Introduction

The Act received royal assent on Thursday 25 June. The Act passed through Parliament very quickly, so that its provisions can be used by companies experiencing financial difficulty as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Act contains:

On 25 June 2020, the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill (the “Bill”) received Royal Assent and on 26 June 2020 CIGA came into force. The restructuring team in Mayer Brown’s London office has previously commented on the different elements of the Bill in a series of blog posts and podcasts.

Our private credit clients are preparing for the next restructuring cycle and have called us about ultrafast bankruptcy cases. These chapter 11 cases have grabbed headlines because they lasted less than a day. Specifically, FullBeauty Brands and Sungard Availability Services emerged from bankruptcy in 24 hours and 19 hours, respectively. Is this a trend and which companies are best suited to zip through chapter 11?

A. Prepacks, Pre-Negotiated Cases, and Free-Falls