The Supreme Court yesterday issued its decision in the long-running case concerning financial support directions (“FSDs”) issued by the UK Pensions Regulator to various companies in the Nortel and Lehman groups. The case considered where a company's obligations under an FSD should rank in relation to its other debts if the company was insolvent when the FSD was issued.
The Supreme Court handed down its decision yesterday on the combined appeals of Nortel GmbH (In Administration) ("Nortel") and Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In Administration) ("Lehman Brothers") (together, the "Appellants") against the Pensions Regulator ("tPR").
Nearly three years after the High Court decision on the case of BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail UK 2007 – 3BL PLC and others was handed down, the case has run its course in the Supreme Court. The case, which considers the correct interpretation of the balance-sheet insolvency test in section 123(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986, is of importance to insolvency practitioners, financial institutions, legal advisers, company directors and companies.
Court of Appeal decision
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on Feb. 14, 2013, held that an insider of a Chapter 11 partnership debtor cannot avoid the “competition rule” in a new-value reorganization plan. The debtor’s equity owner arranged for his wife, also an “insider,” to contribute new value to obtain the equity of the reorganized debtor. In re Castleton Plaza, LP, — F.3d –––, 2013 WL 537269 at *1 (7th Cir., Feb. 14, 2013).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held on Aug. 3, 2012, that equitable considerations could not prevent a creditor's recouping amounts owed to it by a chapter 7 debtor. Terry v. Standard Ins. Co. (In re Terry), 2012 WL 3139364, *4 (8th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012). Reversing the bankruptcy court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP"), the Eighth Circuit explained that "once a party meets the same-transaction test . . . a court should not impose an additional 'balancing of the equities' requirement" on the doctrine of recoupment. Id.
The Pensions Regulator (the “Regulator”) has published a statement setting out its approach to the issuing of financial support directions (“FSDs”) in insolvency situations. The statement is designed to calm fears following the decision in the joined Nortel and Lehman cases that the “super priority” of FSDs could have a negative impact on the corporate rescue and lending industries.
Background
Introduction
Hildyard J’s recent sanctioning of the scheme of arrangement proposed by PrimaCom Holding GmbH (‘’PrimaCom’’), a German incorporated company whose creditors were domiciled outside of the UK, has reaffirmed the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the English courts in respect of schemes of arrangement and confirmed their status as a useful instrument for foreign companies looking to restructure1.
The process
The Court of Appeal has confirmed that the costs of complying with Financial Support Directions (“FSDs”) proposed to be issued to certain Nortel and Lehman companies by the Pensions Regulator (“TPR”) qualify as “super priority” administration expenses, payable in priority to unsecured creditors, floating charge holders and the administrators’ own fees.
The question
In the much anticipated decision of Belmont Park Investments PTY Limited v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc [2011] UKSC 38 the Supreme Court has unanimously dismissed the appeal of Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (“LBSF”) and in so doing provided clarification as to the scope and application of the anti-deprivation rule (the “Rule”).
The Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s ruling that a debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lender had breached its financing agreement, barring its claim for commitment and funding fees from the DIP. Arlington LF, LLC v. Arlington Hospitality, Inc., No. 09-3560, 2011 WL 727981, *9 (7th Cir. March 3, 2011), aff’g No. 08 C 5098, 2011 WL 3055350 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009). Although the DIP itself had also breached the agreement, that breach was not, in the court’s view, effective until after the lender had already “walked away.” Id. at *6.