Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.

Background

Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):

After months of speculation, it is now official : PG&E (both the parent, PG&E Corporation, and its subsidiary, Pacific Gas & Electric Company), having faced extraordinary challenges relating to catastrophic wildfires in 2017 and 2018, has announced that a voluntary bankruptcy filing “is appropriate, necessary and in the best interests of all stakeholders, including wildfire claimants, PG&E’s other creditors and shareholders, and is ultimately the only viable option to restore PG&E’s financial stability to fund ongoing operations and provide safe service to customers.” As

Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784 (2018)

The Supreme Court rules in a recent decision over different bankruptcy incidents. The first relates to a work contract to supply materials in which a penalty clause for late work is established, and the ability to execute the works under the guarantee provided in the contract if the contractor may not execute them. Having a delay in delivery of the work and having entrusted to another company the repair works, the owner claimed the payment of the amounts and compensation with the guarantee held.

A claim filed by insolvency practitioners requesting the termination of contract of payment in kind, which was entered into between a party under insolvency proceedings and a third party, centred on the giving of a slicer machine in consideration of debt; whether the credit of the defendant was qualified as subordinated as a result of damages resulting from the company’s inability to operation, and for violating the principle of equality among creditors.

The new amendments carried out in the BankruptcyProceedings Act by virtue of the Royal Decree 4/2014,dated March 7, aims to introduce a viable restructuringof corporate debt, trying to streamline BankruptcyProceedings and prevailing primacy of will.

On December 5, 2013, Judge Steven Rhodes of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the city of Detroit had satisfied the five expressly delineated eligibility requirements for filing under Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code¹ and so could proceed with its bankruptcy case.

The Supreme Court of Spain has recognized it its Judgment dated September 5th, 2012, the lack of consent in a work contract on which one of the parties applied for the bankruptcy proceedings 10 days after such contract was entered by both parties.

The parties entered into a contract for execution of work by virtue of which the company that few days later applied for the insolvency proceedings, was committed to carry out the works of a building under construction.

Once the bankruptcy proceeding was started, each party issued a claim within the insolvency proceeding.

The Company Court of Alicante, Nº 1, made, in its judgment dated July 20th, 2012, a useful analysis on the different decisions part of the case law in regards to the recognition of pledgesof future receivables and their classification as privileged credit in cases of bankruptcy proceedings, being a very commonly practiced consideration.

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) issued an opinion in In re TOUSA, Inc.,¹ in which it affirmed the original decision of the bankruptcy court and reversed the appellate decision of the district court. After a 13-day trial, the bankruptcy court had found that liens granted by certain TOUSA subsidiaries (the “Conveying Subsidiaries”) to secure new loans (the “New Term Loans”) incurred to pay off preexisting indebtedness to certain lenders (the “Transeastern Lenders”) were avoidable fraudulent transfers.