Both the First Energy Solutions and PG&E bankruptcies have seen proceedings regarding power purchase and similar agreements (PPAs) that raise this question.

Background

Contracts often contain provisions that enable a party to terminate or modify the contract based on the other party's bankruptcy filing, insolvency or deteriorating financial condition. In general, the Bankruptcy Code renders these types of provisions (sometimes referred to as "ipso facto" clauses) ineffective. Specifically, under section 365(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code (emphasis added):

After months of speculation, it is now official : PG&E (both the parent, PG&E Corporation, and its subsidiary, Pacific Gas & Electric Company), having faced extraordinary challenges relating to catastrophic wildfires in 2017 and 2018, has announced that a voluntary bankruptcy filing “is appropriate, necessary and in the best interests of all stakeholders, including wildfire claimants, PG&E’s other creditors and shareholders, and is ultimately the only viable option to restore PG&E’s financial stability to fund ongoing operations and provide safe service to customers.” As

Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., No. 16-784 (2018)

On December 5, 2013, Judge Steven Rhodes of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the city of Detroit had satisfied the five expressly delineated eligibility requirements for filing under Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code¹ and so could proceed with its bankruptcy case.

Background

Under the Pensions Act 2004 the Pensions Regulator (tPR) has the power to impose a financial support direction (FSD) requiring a company “connected or associated” with the sponsoring employer of a UK pension fund to provide financial support to the pension fund. To date tPR has used the power in insolvencies.

This summer has seen several pension issues making the news. They show how essential it is for employers and trustees to keep abreast of how developments impact on their arrangements.

Jay Doraisamy looks at five areas which have made the headlines this summer:

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Circuit Court”) issued an opinion in In re TOUSA, Inc.,¹ in which it affirmed the original decision of the bankruptcy court and reversed the appellate decision of the district court. After a 13-day trial, the bankruptcy court had found that liens granted by certain TOUSA subsidiaries (the “Conveying Subsidiaries”) to secure new loans (the “New Term Loans”) incurred to pay off preexisting indebtedness to certain lenders (the “Transeastern Lenders”) were avoidable fraudulent transfers.

The High Court has recently considered whether a bankrupt individual of pensionable age can be forced to draw his pension to pay his creditors.

Raithatha v. Williamson [2012] EWHC 909 (Ch)

Background

A bankruptcy order was made against Mr Raithatha on 9 November 2010. Mr Raithatha's trustee in bankruptcy applied for an income payments order (IPO) against Mr Raithatha's pension shortly before he was due to be discharged from bankruptcy. Mr Raithatha was then aged 59 and his pension scheme allowed him to draw a pension from age 55.

Pension scheme assets can rise and fall. So can liabilities. The timing of the section 75 debt calculation is, therefore, critically important to the ability of the scheme to meet its liabilities.

So when should trustees calculate their section 75 debt? Can they use one date to calculate scheme assets and choose a different date to calculate the cost of buying out the scheme’s liabilities?

TPR settled its dispute with Michael Van de Wiele (VdW) in relation to its UK pension scheme and issued a Contribution Notice (CN) for £60,000. Although this is significantly less than the £21 million originally sought and the £5.08 million decided by the Determinations Panel, TPR says it is “business as usual” for the use of its statutory anti-avoidance powers. A settlement at this level might be viewed as a defeat for TPR and an indication that CNs are not a potent weapon to deal with the avoidance of employer debts. That view would be seriously misguided.