The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut recently examined a question at the heart of an existing circuit split regarding the consequences of trademark license rejection in bankruptcy: can a trademark licensee retain the use of a licensed trademark post-rejection? In re SIMA International, Inc., 2018 WL 2293705 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 17, 2018).

On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court resolved a circuit split regarding the proper application of the safe harbor set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, a provision that prohibits the avoidance of a transfer if the transfer was made in connection with a securities contract and made by or to (or for the benefit of) certain qualified entities, including a financial institution.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – a provision which, in effect, prohibits confirmation of a plan unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired class of claims – applies on “per plan” rather than a “per debtor” basis, even when the plan at issue covers multiple debtors. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 2018 WL 615431 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). The Court is the first circuit court to address the issue.

Since the landmark decision in Re Solfire Pty Ltd (In Liq) (No. 2) [1999] 2 Qd R 182, the Queensland Supreme Court has often marched to its own tune when reviewing applications for insolvency practitioner remuneration and disbursements. In two related decisions arising from the insolvency of LM Investment Management and managed investment schemes of which it is responsible entity, the Court has now turned its attention to the controversies in this area over proportionality and access to trust assets with which its counterparts in New South Wales have grappled over the last 18 months.

In a series of recent decisions1, the Federal Court of Australia has held that section 588FL of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) operates such that any new security granted by a company in external administration2. that could only be perfected by registration on the Personal Property Securities Register (PPSR), and which is not the subject of an effective registration made before the appointment of the external administrator, will be ineffective3.

Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

In a wide-reaching judgment concerning an appeal by Mighty River International in the administration of Mesa Minerals, the Western Australian Court of Appeal has recognised that a "holding" Deed of Company Arrangement (DOCA) is permissible under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act.

The key points - Holding DOCAs as a flexible framework

The key points for insolvency and turnaround professionals to take from Mighty River International v. Hughes are:

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

Court of Appeal sets the record straight

The key point

On March 9, 2017, a full bench of the New South Wales Court of Appeal handed down a significant decision affecting approach to judicial review and approval of liquidator remuneration. Significantly, existing tension between decisions of different judges at first instance, and between NSW and Federal courts, has been resolved.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.¹  The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles.  GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi