When it comes to voting on a plan, Section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court may designate (or disallow) the votes of any entity whose vote to accept or reject was not made in “good faith” (a term that is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code).

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code shields certain transfers involving settlement payments and other payments in connection with securities contracts (for example, payment for stock) made to certain financial intermediaries, such as banks, from avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance or preferential transfer. In recent years, several circuit courts interpreted 546(e) as applying to a transfer that flows through a financial intermediary, even if the ultimate recipient of the transfer would not qualify for the protection of 546(e).

Since the landmark decision in Re Solfire Pty Ltd (In Liq) (No. 2) [1999] 2 Qd R 182, the Queensland Supreme Court has often marched to its own tune when reviewing applications for insolvency practitioner remuneration and disbursements. In two related decisions arising from the insolvency of LM Investment Management and managed investment schemes of which it is responsible entity, the Court has now turned its attention to the controversies in this area over proportionality and access to trust assets with which its counterparts in New South Wales have grappled over the last 18 months.

In a series of recent decisions1, the Federal Court of Australia has held that section 588FL of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) operates such that any new security granted by a company in external administration2. that could only be perfected by registration on the Personal Property Securities Register (PPSR), and which is not the subject of an effective registration made before the appointment of the external administrator, will be ineffective3.

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision which, among other things,[1] affirmed the lower courts’ holding that certain noteholders were not entitled to payment of a make-whole premium. The Second Circuit held that the make-whole premium only was due in the case of an optional redemption, and not in the case of an acceleration brought about by a bankruptcy filing.

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision regarding the manner in which interest must be calculated to satisfy the cramdown requirements in a chapter 11 case.[1] The Second Circuit sided with Momentive’s senior noteholders and found that “take back” paper issued pursuant to a chapter 11 plan should bear a market rate of interest when the market rate can be ascerta

On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.

In a wide-reaching judgment concerning an appeal by Mighty River International in the administration of Mesa Minerals, the Western Australian Court of Appeal has recognised that a "holding" Deed of Company Arrangement (DOCA) is permissible under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act.

The key points - Holding DOCAs as a flexible framework

The key points for insolvency and turnaround professionals to take from Mighty River International v. Hughes are:

Court of Appeal sets the record straight

The key point

On March 9, 2017, a full bench of the New South Wales Court of Appeal handed down a significant decision affecting approach to judicial review and approval of liquidator remuneration. Significantly, existing tension between decisions of different judges at first instance, and between NSW and Federal courts, has been resolved.

In less than a week after its bankruptcy filing, a debtor was able to obtain confirmation of its prepackaged plan of reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In allowing the case to be confirmed on a compressed timeframe that was unprecedented for cases filed in the Southern District of New York, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 28-day notice period for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan could run coextensively with the period under which creditor votes on the plan were solicited prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.