The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act signed into law on December 22, 2017, amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (IRC) and made significant changes to the treatment of individual and corporate taxpayers beginning January 1, 2018. While many understand that the overall corporate tax rate is going down, the specific effects of this tax reform on distressed companies, debtors, creditors, and lenders are still being uncovered. Practical Law asked Patrick M. Cox of Baker McKenzie LLP to discuss his views on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) and its potential impact on the Chapter 11 process.

This is part of a series of articles discussing restructuring and insolvency related provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which is now expected to become law this week (the “Act”).

Previously we discussed net operating losses (“NOLs”) and cancellation of the debt (“COD”). The provisions on NOLs have generally remained the same (adopting the Senate version of the revisions, but immediately capping the use of NOLs to 80% of taxable income). However, the changes to COD rules we discussed are not part of the current version of the Act.

This is the second part in a series of articles discussing certain restructuring and insolvency related provisions of the Tax Reform. Previously we discussed net operating losses (“NOLs”), and noted that the House and Senate plans are quite similar when it comes to NOLs. That is not the case with the provisions in H.R. 1 that relate to cancellation of the debt (“COD”).

Congress is attempting to pass tax reform legislation and presently the House of Representatives and the Senate have separate proposals under consideration (separately, H.R. 1 and the Senate Plan, respectively, and collectively, “Tax Reform”). The Tax Reform is changing daily, but one thing seems likely and that is that the Tax Reform will change the treatment of net operating losses (“NOLs”). These changes would have the most significant impact to bankruptcy cases filed after December 31, 2017.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.