Since the landmark decision in Re Solfire Pty Ltd (In Liq) (No. 2) [1999] 2 Qd R 182, the Queensland Supreme Court has often marched to its own tune when reviewing applications for insolvency practitioner remuneration and disbursements. In two related decisions arising from the insolvency of LM Investment Management and managed investment schemes of which it is responsible entity, the Court has now turned its attention to the controversies in this area over proportionality and access to trust assets with which its counterparts in New South Wales have grappled over the last 18 months.

In a series of recent decisions1, the Federal Court of Australia has held that section 588FL of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) operates such that any new security granted by a company in external administration2. that could only be perfected by registration on the Personal Property Securities Register (PPSR), and which is not the subject of an effective registration made before the appointment of the external administrator, will be ineffective3.

The Bankruptcy Code limits in many ways the rights of nondebtors under contracts with a debtor in bankruptcy. There are, however, some crucial exceptions, which Congress deemed important for the orderly function of the securities markets. In particular, agreements governing securities repurchase (or repo) transactions involving a financial institution may be terminated and liquidated notwithstanding the bankruptcy filing of the repo seller.

Yesterday in Canberra, a significant step forward for Australian insolvency law reform was taken: Parliament passed the much anticipated "safe harbor" for directors in relation to insolvent trading liability and moratorium on reliance by solvent counterparties on “ipso facto” clauses in voluntary administration and creditors schemes of arrangement.

Key Points

On the key points:

In a wide-reaching judgment concerning an appeal by Mighty River International in the administration of Mesa Minerals, the Western Australian Court of Appeal, has recognised that “holding” Deed of Company Arrangement (DOCA) is permissible under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act.

The key points – Holding DOCAs as a flexible framework

The key points for insolvency and turnaround professionals to take from Mighty River International v Hughes are:

In a decision of importance for liquidators and litigation funders, the Western Australian Court of Appeal in Perrine v Carrello has further explained the important issue of how to determine the amount of compensation recoverable by liquidators where insolvent trading has occurred.

In a wide-reaching judgment concerning an appeal by Mighty River International in the administration of Mesa Minerals, the Western Australian Court of Appeal has recognised that a "holding" Deed of Company Arrangement (DOCA) is permissible under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act.

The key points - Holding DOCAs as a flexible framework

The key points for insolvency and turnaround professionals to take from Mighty River International v. Hughes are:

A recent case in New York State Supreme Court, One Williams Street Capital Management LP v. U.S. Education Loan Trust IV, LLC (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. May 15, 2015), affords a useful opportunity to review the applicability and scope of §13-107 of the New York General Obligations Law, which provides that a transfer of a bond “vests in the transferee all claims or demands of the transferrer.” The court observed that §13-107 extends to all claims, whether in contract or in tort, including fraud.

Indentures and other agreements governing complex, multitiered structured debt products will typically contain a series of reserves, the adequacy of whose funding will take precedence over payments to noteholders. While the funding requirements of the reserve accounts will be set forth in the agreement, the formulation of these provisions will leave administrators considerable leeway in determining the cash maintenance levels appropriate for the various accounts. In a recent case, UMB National Association v. Airplanes Limited (S.D.N.Y.

Unlike an opinion, an order of the court is often not from the pen of the judge. Typically, a court order is submitted to the judge after negotiation among the parties. So, when a disagreement arises among the parties regarding the interpretation of the court’s order, how does the judge who signed the order go about resolving the matter? The issue came up not long ago in Outer Harbor Terminal LLC (Bkr. D. Del. May, 5, 2017), in which Judge Laurie Silverstein of the District of  Delaware bankruptcy court was confronted with a dispute over her own final DIP order.