The appointment of an independent director is a powerful tool for private credit lenders. The appointment is designed to introduce a voice of neutrality and fairness into the board’s decision-making process with the hope and expectation that independence from the controlling shareholder enables the board to drive toward viable value-maximizing strategies. Often times, the independent director is vested with exclusive authority (or veto rights) over a range of significant corporate decisions, including a sale, restructuring and the decision to file a bankruptcy case.
One common denominator links nearly all stressed businesses: tight liquidity. After the liquidity hole is identified and sized, the discussion inevitably turns to the question of who will fund the necessary capital to extend the liquidity runway. For a PE-backed business where there is a credible path to recovery, a sponsor, due to its existing equity stake, is often willing to inject additional capital into an underperforming portfolio company.
In a much-anticipated decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that unsecured noteholders’ claims against a debtor for certain “Applicable Premiums” were the “economic equivalent” to unmatured interest and, therefore, not recoverable under section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Employment (Collective Redundancies and Miscellaneous Provisions) and Companies (Amendment) Act 2023 (Collective Redundancies AmendmentAct) came into operation on 1 July 2024.
The Employment (Collective Redundancies and Miscellaneous Provisions) and Companies (Amendment) Act 2023 (Act) came into effect on 1 July 2024.
The Employment (Collective Redundancies and Miscellaneous Provisions) and Companies (Amendment) Act 2024 (Act) has been signed into law but awaits a commencement order to bring it into operation.
In summary, the Act amends the Companies Act 2014 (Companies Act) by modifying the attribution test for related companies to contribute to the debts of the company being wound up, broadening the operative time for unfair preferences, and varying the test for reckless trading.
1. Related company contribution
As you know from our prior alerts, creditors of borrowers formed as Delaware LLCs (as opposed to corporations) lack standing under Delaware law to sue directors for breaching fiduciary duties even when, to the surprise of many, the LLC is insolvent. See our prior Alert. The disparity of substantive creditor rights depending entirely on corporate form results from two aspects of Delaware law.
There is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A structured dismissal is a cost‑effective way for a debtor to exit chapter 11 and is an alternative to (a) confirming a post‑sale liquidating plan, which is expensive and not always viable, or (b) converting the case to chapter 7, which introduces significant uncertainty and unpredictability with the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee to replace management.
Following on from the UK Supreme Court decision in Sequana (discussed here), the recent UK High Court (UKHC) decision in Hunt v Singh [2023] EWHC 1784 (Ch), further considered the duty of directors to take into account the interests of creditors in certain circumstances.
The High Court (Court) recently dismissed a petition seeking the winding up of a biofuel company (Company).
The ex tempore judgment is of note because it considers the standing of the Petitioner to bring the application and the consequences of a relevant witness not being cross-examined by the Petitioner on his affidavit evidence regarding the solvency of the Company.
Background