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In a departure from prior precedent in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY), a recent opinion by Judge Michael E. Wiles in In re Cortlandt Liquidating LLC,[1] effectively lowered the Bankruptcy Code section 502(b)(6) cap on rejection damages that a commercial real estate landlord may claim, by holding that the cap should be calculated using the “Time Approach,” rather than the “Rent Approach.”

Calculation of Lease Rejection Damages

On Sunday, December 27, 2020, President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, which provides $900 billion in a second wave of economic stimulus relief for industries and individuals faced with challenges from the COVID-19 coronavirus.

The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered unprecedented levels of business disruption and forced numerous companies into bankruptcy in an effort to preserve dwindling liquidity and postpone creditor demands. Retailers, whose brick-and-mortar locations were already struggling to adapt to an increasingly online marketplace, have been among the hardest hit. A number of bankruptcy judges, faced with the prospect of an avalanche of forced liquidations, have thrown these debtors a lifeline by approving requests to suspend lease payments.

If the current coronavirus (COVID-19) situation persists, real estate lenders increasingly will be faced with the need to restructure loans in their portfolios. Lenders that held non-performing real estate loans during prior real estate downturns (e.g., 2008, 1990s) have no doubt embarked on the real estate workout process countless times before. However, with the passage of time, the lessons learned by real estate lenders of earlier eras may have faded from memory. Moreover, many of the lenders active in real estate finance today were not even on the scene during prior recessions.

On 24 March 2020, the Coronavirus Economic Response Package Omnibus Bill 2020 received Royal Assent, meaning that the changes proposed in that bill to "lessen the threat of insolvency" for individuals and businesses in the current coronavirus pandemic have now become law. The changes will be in place for a period of six months starting from today and ending on 25 September 2020, unless this grace period is extended in the future.

By way of summary, the legislative changes involve the following measures:

On 4 February 2020, the Federal Court of Australia considered the circumstances in which it might be said that a provisional liquidator of a company ought not be appointed as the official liquidator because of an alleged "reasonable apprehension of bias". The issue was ventilated before the Court in the matter of  Frisken (as receiver of Avant Garde Investments Pty Ltd v Cheema [2020] FCA 98.

Appointing a provisional liquidator

Entering into liquidation can be a scary time for any company and its officers, even one which chooses to do so voluntarily. However, the directors, shareholders and creditors of a company entering into liquidation do not have absolute discretion as to who they may appoint as the liquidator of the company. Together, the Corporations Act and common law principles of independence regulate the eligibility of a liquidator to be appointed to a company, and to remain in the appointment.

Overarching eligibility

In the recent decision of Boensch as Trustee of the Boensch Trust v Scott Darren Pascoe [2019] HCA 49, the High Court has clarified whether property held by a bankrupt on trust for another vests in the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy, and the circumstances in which a trustee in bankruptcy will have reasonable cause to lodge a caveat to protect an interest in the trust property.

Background

In the recent decision of In the matter of Parkway One Pty Limited (in liquidation) [2019] NSWSC 1495 (Parkway), Rees J dismissed an application to terminate the winding up of Parkway One Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (the Company) due to inconclusive evidence as to the solvency of the Company and, having regard to the non-compliance by its director of her statutory duties and the likelihood of the Company not being able to service the current and foreseen indebtedness, her Honour held that it would be contrary to commercial morality to terminate the wi