In a recent case involving key stakeholders in the ‘Century Mine’ (Mine) – located in the lower Gulf of Carpentaria region in Northwest Queensland – the Supreme Court of Queensland considered an application brought by a liquidator and creditor for the termination of a winding up of pursuant to section 482(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Application).

Background

The Mine was operated by Century Mining Ltd (formerly Century Zinc Ltd) (Century). It was one of the largest zinc mines in the world.

The Federal Court’s recent decision in Kellendonk concerned a $350,000 loan made by the applicants, Mr and Mrs Kellendonk, to Ms Maria Jasienska-Dudek to help her buy a property in Midland, Western Australia (Property). Ms Jasienska-Dudek defaulted under the loan agreement and the parties subsequently entered an informal agreement which, after Ms Jasienska-Dudek became a bankrupt, led to some novel circumstances and a novel application of section 133 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Bankruptcy Act).

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

In Re Cullen Group,[1] the Supreme Court of Queensland considered the determination of a preliminary question regarding the insolvency of Cullen Group Australia Pty Ltd (Cullen Group), which was placed into liquidation approximately four years prior to the hearing date.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

In the recent decision of Cant v Mad Brothers Earthmoving,[1] the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Justices Beach, McLeish and Hargrave) considered whether the liquidator of Eliana Construction and Developing Group (in liquidation) (Eliana) could establish that a payment made to an unsecured creditor of Eliana by one of Eliana’s related companies was an unfair preference.

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

In the recent Gunns decisions, the Federal Court considered three separate unfair preference claims brought by the liquidators of Gunns Limited (in Liquidation) (Gunns) against:

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.