A “silent” creditor in Subchapter V is one who does not vote on the debtor’s plan and does not object to that plan. The “silent” creditor is a problem for Subchapter V cases.
The Problem
Here’s the problem:
Here are a couple discharge-related bankruptcy questions I’ve heard of late, along with an answer.
Question 1. Why are individuals, but not corporations, eligible for a Chapter 7 discharge?
- §727(a)(1) says, “the court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless—(1) the debtor is not an individual” (emphasis added).
Question 2. Why are individuals, but not corporations, subject to § 523(a) discharge exceptions in Chapter 11?
Can non-compete and confidentiality protections in a rejected franchise agreement be discharged in bankruptcy?
The answer is, “No,” according to In re Empower Central Michigan, Inc.[Fn. 1]
Facts
Debtor is an automotive repair shop.
Debtor operates under a Franchise Agreement with Autolab Franchising, LLC. The Franchise Agreement has a non-compete provision, and there is a separate-but-related confidentiality agreement.
The continuing effort in Congress to extend Subchapter V’s $7.5 million debt limit recently hit a snag. The result: the $7.5 million debt limit for Subchapter V eligibility expired on June 21, 2024, and the Subchapter V debt limit is now reduced to an inflation-adjusted $3,024,725.[i]
The phrase “Texas Two-Step,” as used in bankruptcy, is a legal expletive. Regardless of what the details of a Texas Two-Step might be, the phrase has become synonymous with:
- abusive behavior;
- bad faith conduct;
- a means for swindling creditors;
- the antithesis of “doing what’s right”;
- a tool for avoiding liability;
- etc., etc.
Describing a legal tactic as a “Texas Two-Step” is like calling that tactic a “#$&*#%R&” or “#*$&.” It’s a legal expletive that means “really, really bad.”
Here’s a dilemma:
- Should bankruptcy be available as a tool for resolving mass tort cases of all types (like it already is in asbestos contexts)?
Here’s an illustration of the dilemma:
- many tort claimants in the Johnson & Johnson case DO NOT want bankruptcy involved; but
- many tort claimants in the Purdue Pharma case were BEGGING the courts to approve the bankruptcy plan.
How do we solve this dilemma?
The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion is Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc., Case No. 22-1079, Decided June 6, 2024.
Opinion’s Q & A
The Truck Insurance question is this:
- Whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a “party in interest” under § 1109(b)?
The Supreme Court’s answer is this:
On April 23, 2024, the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Subchapter V Task Force issued its Final Report.
This article is the eighth in a series summarizing and condensing the Task Force’s Final Report into “a nutshell.” The subject of this article is:
- whether the Subchapter V trustee or other party in interest should be allowed to file a plan after debtor’s removal from possession.[Fn. 1]
Recommendation
We have a direct statutory conflict:
- one statute requires an ERISA dispute to be resolved in arbitration; but
- a bankruptcy statute requires the same dispute to be resolved in bankruptcy.
Which statute should prevail? The bankruptcy statute, of course.
- That’s the conclusion of In re Yellow Corp.[Fn. 1]
Statutory Conflict
The In re Yellow Corp. case presents a direct conflict between these two federal statutes (emphases added):
On April 23, 2024, the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Subchapter V Task Force issued its Final Report.
This article is the seventh in a series summarizing and condensing the Task Force’s Final Report into “a nutshell.” The subject of this article is:
- whether the $7,500,000 debt cap for Subchapter V eligibility should remain or revert to an interest-adjusted $3,024,725.
Recommendation