In Nicholas Stewart Wood and David John Standish (as the joint trustees in bankruptcy of Karl Eric Watkin) v Kate Rebecca Watkin [2019] EWHC 1311 (Ch), trustees in bankruptcy sought to establish that a bankrupt (theBankrupt) was the sole beneficial owner of three properties (theProperties), ostensibly purchased by him for his adult daughter. The High Court refused the application and held that the Bankrupt was not the sole beneficial owner of the Properties.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

INTRODUCTION

The use of trusts for asset protection purposes is well established and – in principle – not improper. However, recent history has seen increasing attempts by creditors to have transfers of assets unwound. A recent UK Supreme Court case saw the Court effectively achieve this by way of a resulting trust finding.1 This article considers the issue from a different angle: insolvency legislation.

In Lockston Group Inc v Nicholas Stewart Wood [2015] EWHC 2962 (Ch), the English High Court held that foreign currency claims and claims for interest in a deceased insolvent's estate should be calculated at the date of death, rather than the date of any insolvency administration order. This case serves as a reminder of the importance of the pari passu principle in insolvency law and the requirement for a single date for ascertaining a deceased insolvent's liabilities.

Facts

In Paul David Wood & Anor v Timothy Darren Baker & Ors, the joint trustees in bankruptcy of the bankrupt's property successfully obtained injunctions freezing the assets and business of the respondents and restraining them from dealing with such assets and business.  This case is an illustration of how the court may apply the "evasion principle", a principle identified in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd, in piercing the corporate veil.

Background

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.