A discharge of debt in bankruptcy “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). Certain debts, however, including debts “for violation of . . . any of the State securities laws,” are not subject to discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). A discharge injunction does not bar the collection of such debts.
From 31 December 2020, the European Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (the “EIR”) ceased to apply in the UK. As a result:
At 11pm on 31 December 2020, the UK left the European single market at the end of the transition period agreed as part of the 2019 Withdrawal Agreement. The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement that was reached on Christmas Eve made no provision for continued recognition of, or co-operation in, insolvency and restructuring proceedings. This briefing considers the implications of this and we examine how:
At 11pm on 31 December 2020, the UK left the European single market at the end of the transition period agreed as part of the 2019 Withdrawal Agreement. The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement that was reached on Christmas Eve made no provision for continued recognition of, or co-operation in, insolvency and restructuring proceedings. This briefing considers the implications of this and we examine how:
Background and purpose of the proposals
On 8th January proposals for a new ‘Prepackaged Insolvency Resolution Process’ ("PIRP") were issued by the Indian Ministry of Corporate Affairs for public consultation, and we have considered them from a foreign perspective.
The proposals are continuing evidence of the Indian Government’s admirable ongoing commitment to swift further development and improvement of the insolvency framework that was introduced five years ago in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (“IBC”).
We have blogged previously about section 546(e), the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor for certain transfers otherwise subject to avoidance as preferences or fraudulent transfers. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e). Among the transfers protected by the section 546(e) safe harbor are transfers by or to a “financial participant” made “in connection with a securities contract.” Id.
The Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. These avoidance powers are subject to certain limitations, including a safe harbor in section 546(e) exempting certain transfers. Among other things, section 546(e) bars avoidance of a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . .
Last February, we blogged about the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Energy Future Holdings Corp, No. 19-1430, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4947 (Feb. 18, 2020). The Third Circuit approved a process for resolving asbestos claims in which a bar date was imposed on filing the claims, but late claimants who were unaware of their asbestos claims would be allowed to have the bar date excused through Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3). (A bar date is a date set by the court by which all claims against the debtor must be filed.
Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, when a transfer is avoided under one of several other sections of the Code, a trustee may recover “the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property” from “the initial transferee of such transfer,” “the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made,” or “any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.” 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).
In what is likely to be one of this year’s landmark insolvency decisions, the Supreme Court in Bresco v Lonsdale has considered the interaction between insolvency set-off and adjudication, though the judgment is likely to have application to other dispute resolution processes including litigation and arbitration. The Supreme Court, unlike the High Court and Court of Appeal, permitted the adjudication to continue and, in doing so, dismissed the suggestion that insolvency set-off always results in the extinction of cross-claims to be replaced by a single claim for the balance.