The Court of Appeal has struck out Quincecare duty and dishonest assistance claims brought by the liquidators of a company running a Ponzi scheme against a correspondent bank that operated various accounts for the company.

In March, we reported on a brief filed by the Solicitor General recommending denial of a petition for certiorari filed by Tribune creditors seeking Supreme Court review of the Second Circuit ruling dismissing their state-law fraudulent transfer claims.

A discharge of debt in bankruptcy “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). Certain debts, however, including debts “for violation of . . . any of the State securities laws,” are not subject to discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). A discharge injunction does not bar the collection of such debts.

From 31 December 2020, the European Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (the “EIR”) ceased to apply in the UK. As a result:

At 11pm on 31 December 2020, the UK left the European single market at the end of the transition period agreed as part of the 2019 Withdrawal Agreement. The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement that was reached on Christmas Eve made no provision for continued recognition of, or co-operation in, insolvency and restructuring proceedings. This briefing considers the implications of this and we examine how:

The High Court has dismissed a strike out application in respect of a claim brought under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (“IA 1986”) in respect of an alleged transaction defrauding creditors, holding that it is not necessary to prove a freestanding connection between the defendant and England, separate from the litigation itself, in order to obtain relief: Suppipat v Narongdej [2020] EWHC 3191 (Comm).

We have blogged previously about section 546(e), the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor for certain transfers otherwise subject to avoidance as preferences or fraudulent transfers. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e). Among the transfers protected by the section 546(e) safe harbor are transfers by or to a “financial participant” made “in connection with a securities contract.” Id.

The Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. These avoidance powers are subject to certain limitations, including a safe harbor in section 546(e) exempting certain transfers. Among other things, section 546(e) bars avoidance of a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . .

Last February, we blogged about the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Energy Future Holdings Corp, No. 19-1430, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4947 (Feb. 18, 2020). The Third Circuit approved a process for resolving asbestos claims in which a bar date was imposed on filing the claims, but late claimants who were unaware of their asbestos claims would be allowed to have the bar date excused through Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3). (A bar date is a date set by the court by which all claims against the debtor must be filed.

The High Court has expedited a trial at which it would be determined whether luxury car manufacturer McLaren Group could obtain the release of certain security for the benefit of its senior noteholders, failing which a financial restructuring which was contingent on that release could not be implemented: McLaren Holdings Ltd v US Bank Trustees Ltd [2020] EWHC 1892 (Ch). The court concluded that, absent determination of the proceedings within one month, McLaren Group would have no choice but to enter an insolvency process and that this justified expedition in this case.