In Joint Provisional Liquidators of Moody Technology Holdings Ltd [2020] HKCFI 416, the Hong Kong Court of First Instance (the “Hong KongCourt”) granted a recognition order to foreign provisional liquidators who were appointed on a soft-touch basis, to explore and facilitate the restructuring of a company. The order was made despite soft-touch provisional liquidation being per se impermissible in Hong Kong.

Background

The principle in ex parte James, under which the Court will not permit its officers (such as a liquidator) to act in a way which, although lawful, does not accord with the standards of right-thinking people, has recently been clarified by the English Court of Appeal in Lehman Brothers Australia Limited (in liquidation) v Edward John Macnamara & others (the joint administrators of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration)) [2020] EWCA Civ 321

What makes a contract an unprofitable contract which can be disclaimed by a trustee in bankruptcy without the leave of the Court under section 133(5A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act)? Can a litigation funding agreement be considered an unprofitable contract when the agreement provides for a significant funder's premium or charge of 80% (85% in the case of an appeal)?

In a long-awaited development of cross-border insolvency cooperation between Hong Kong and Mainland China, the Hong Kong Court has granted recognition and assistance to Mainland liquidators for the first time in Joint and Several Liquidators of CEFC Shanghai International Group Ltd [2020] HKCFI 167.

Background

In a recent decision, the Federal Court of Australia declined to annul a bankruptcy in circumstances where the bankrupt claimed the proceedings should have been adjourned given his incarceration and solvency at the time the order was made: Mehajer v Weston in his Capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Salim Mehajer [2019] FCA 1713. The judgment is useful in reiterating what factors the Court will consider when deciding whether to order an annulment under section 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).

Generally, once a company enters into liquidation, litigation against that company cannot be commenced or be continued without the leave of the Court (Corporations Act 2001, s 471B). However, occasionally a liquidator may cause a company to commence or defend litigation after the commencement of the winding up. What happens if the company in liquidation is unsuccessful in that litigation and is subject to an adverse cost order? How will such an adverse cost order rank amongst other competing creditors?

Getting to the top

The Federal Court of Australia recently struck off an insolvency practitioner from the register of liquidators and restrained him for ten years for acting as an insolvency practitioner. The case concerns the conduct of David Iannuzi, who the Court found had "repeatedly fell short of the standards that would ordinarily be expected of him as a competent registered liquidator". The judgment sets out in detail the conduct that the Court found to be unsatisfactory and serves as a reminder of the standards expected of liquidators.

Background

The Court of First Instance has recently helpfully summarised the legal position on schemes of arrangement under both Hong Kong law and English law. Notably, it has called for further development in cross-border coordination in order to avoid the trouble of parallel insolvency proceedings and it has raised a red flag in relation to detailed disclosure of restructuring costs: Da Yu Financial Holdings Limited [2019] HKCFI 2531.

It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?

Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.