Major changes to bankruptcy rules that govern the administration of consumer bankruptcy cases, and Chapter 13 cases in particular, were recently approved by the Supreme Court and transmitted to Congress.1 After several years of drafting and debate by the rules committee, these rule amendments will become effective December 1, 2017.

On March 9, 2017, a bankruptcy court in New York became the latest to weigh in on the developing circuit court split regarding whether modification of mortgages should be permitted under 11 U.S.C.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (the District Court) recently issued an opinion in the Paul Sagendorph bankruptcy case reversing the Bankruptcy Court's holding that a debtor can force a secured creditor to take title to its collateral in complete satisfaction of the creditor's secured claim.1 In reversing the decision of the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court held that the plain language of Sections 1322(b)(9) and 1325(a)(5)(C)2 does not empower a debtor to force a secured creditor to accept title to its collateral over that creditor's objection.3

By now, you will all be aware of the recently gazetted the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) (Amendment) Ordinance 2016 ("Amendment Ordinance"), heralding as it does a much anticipated refreshment and modernisation of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance ("CWUMPO") and the Companies (Winding up) Rules ("CWUR").

Given that the last major amendments to the corporate winding-up regime in Hong Kong occurred in 1984, reform in this area is long overdue.

In Erceg v Erceg¹ the New Zealand Court of Appeal ruled on the standing of bankrupt beneficiaries to bring claims against trustees. In addition, the Court considered the role of trustee discretion when determining beneficiary access to trust documentation. The decision is useful for trustees and beneficiaries alike, and provides clarity on the steps a Court may take when deciding whether or not to grant beneficiaries disclosure of trust information. Although this is a New Zealand decision, other common law courts such as Hong Kong may reach similar conclusions.

In Re Hin-Pro International Logistics Limited[1], the Hong Kong Court of First Instance held that it has jurisdiction to grant leave to amend a creditor's winding up petition to include debts accrued only after its presentation.

In Wong Tak Man, Stephen & Another v Cheung Siu Fai & Ors [2015] HMP 1431/2012, the Court held that transfers of funds made by a bankrupt were not transactions at undervalue or unfair preferences pursuant to s49 and s50 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (the "BO"). This case serves as a useful reminder on how the Court will interpret s49 and s50 BO, as deemed to be applied in a corporate context by s.266B(1)(a) of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 32).

Facts 

In its landmark decision of Kam Leung Sui Kwan v Kam Kwan Lai & Ors FACV 4/2015, issued yesterday, the Court of Final Appeal has brought some closure to the long running Yung Kee restaurant matter by making a winding up order against Yung Kee Holdings Limited (YKHL) with a 28-day stay to allow the parties to consider possible buy-out opportunities.  This reverses the previous decisions in the Court of First Instance and the

The case of Re Company A-E [2015] HCMP 2019/2015 demonstrates that the Court will take a practical approach in determining whether a funding arrangement infringes upon the common law rules against maintenance and champerty. The Court will consider commercial factors, such as the underlying rationale for the funding arrangement and the commercial character of the funder, alongside its analysis of the common law principles.

On May 4, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an opinion regarding a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (the “First Circuit”).1 The question on appeal was whether debtor Louis Bullard (“Bullard”) could immediately appeal the bankruptcy court’s order denying confirmation of his proposed Chapter 13 payment plan (the “Plan”).2 The Court held that denial of confirmation of a debtor’s plan is not a final, appealable order.3  

Case Background