On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).
The Facts
The debtor borrowed significantly from leading domestic investment banks to finance a major construction project. The loan was secured by a pledge established on all of the debtor’s existing and future claims, including rental fees arising from an office building owned by the debtor.
What Happens to Pledges over Receivables when the Pledgor goes into Liquidation?
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.1 The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles. GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi
On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it. The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Tribune Co.
Hungarian insolvency law provides for a right of the liquidator to terminate, with immediate effect, contracts concluded by the debtor, or – in case neither of the parties rendered any services – to rescind the contract. This applies even in cases where contractual provisions or relevant legislation would otherwise prohibit the termination of the given contract.
With the effect of 1 September 2015, Hungary introduces legal provisions on personal insolvency. Such procedure is reserved for private individuals (may they be entrepreneurs or consumers), who have debts between HUF 2 mln (approx. EUR 6,500) and HUF 60 mln (approx.EUR 195,000).
The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. [1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.
Background
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.
Under Hungarian insolvency law, creditors secured by mortgages or pledges are entitled to privileged satisfaction of their claim, meaning concretely that they are entitled to receive the whole proceeds reached in the course of the realization of the pledged property after deduction of the (i) cost of keeping the property in good repair and of maintenance, and costs of selling the pledged property; and (ii) the liquidator’s fee up to 5% of the net purchase price.
On October 31, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Kaplan of the District of New Jersey addressed two issues critically important to intellectual property licensees and purchasers: (i) can a trademark licensee use section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to keep licensed marks following a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement?; and (ii) can a “free and clear” sale of intellectual property eliminate any rights retained by a licensee? In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., et al., 2014 WL 5508177 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014).