In a May 4, 2015 opinion¹ , the United States Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court order denying confirmation of a chapter 13 repayment plan is not a final order subject to immediate appeal. The Supreme Court found that, in contrast to an order confirming a plan or dismissing a case, an order denying confirmation of a plan neither alters the status quo nor fixes the rights and obligations of the parties. Although the decision arose in the context of a chapter 13 plan, it should apply with equal force to chapter 11 cases.

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, which had approved the structured dismissal of the Chapter 11 cases of Jevic Holding Corp., et al. The Court of Appeals first held that structured dismissals are not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code, and then upheld the structured dismissal in the Jevic case, despite the fact that the settlement embodied in the structured dismissal order deviated from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.

In a memorandum decision dated May 4, 2015, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the September 2014 decision of Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, confirming the joint plans of reorganization (the “Plan”) in the Chapter 11 cases of MPM Silicones LLC and its affiliates (“Momentive”). Appeals were taken on three separate parts of Judge Drain’s confirmation decision, each of which ultimately was affirmed by the district court:

Under Hungarian insolvency law, creditors secured by mortgages or pledges are entitled to privileged satisfaction of their claim, meaning concretely that they are entitled to receive the whole proceeds reached in the course of the realization of the pledged property after deduction of the (i) cost of keeping the property in good repair and of maintenance, and costs of selling the pledged property; and (ii) the liquidator’s fee up to 5% of the net purchase price.

In In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“Madoff”),1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reaffirmed  its broad and literal interpretation of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides a  safe harbor for transfers made in connection with a securities contract that might otherwise be  attacked as preferences or fraudulent transfers.

Potential liability for wrongful trading

In Hungary the Act no. XLIX of 1991 on the insolvency and compulsory winding up procedure (hereinafter referred to as “Insolvency Act”) established the term “wrongful trading”. Under section 33/A of the Insolvency Act a manager of a company shall be personally liable if after the occurrence of threatening insolvency (i.e. when the company is unable to settle its liabilities when due) the director’s duties have not been fulfilled based on the priority of the company’s creditors’ interest.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently held in Edward S. Weisfelner, as Litigation Trustee of the LB Creditor Trust v. Fund 1., et al.

In a case of importance to foreign representatives of foreign debtors seeking the assistance of US courts pursuant to chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that the debtor eligibility requirements of section 109(a) of the US Bankruptcy Code apply in cases under chapter 15 as they would in cases under other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code. The decision in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), Case No. 13-612 (2d Cir. Dec.

On April 16, 2013, in Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.),¹ the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision informing fundamental concepts of cross-border insolvency law as implemented pursuant to Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.