From 1 December 2020 onwards, HMRC will be treated as a preferential creditor of companies for certain taxes including PAYE, VAT, employee NICs and Construction Industry Scheme deductions. In the event that a company enters administration or liquidation, HMRC's claim for these taxes will rank ahead of any floating charge holder.

This reflects recent changes made to the Finance Act 2020.

The impact on floating charge holders

On 13 January 2021, the English High Court sanctioned three interconditional Part 26A restructuring plans for the subsidiaries of DeepOcean Group Holding BV.

The plans for two of the companies were approved by the required 75% majority. While the third plan received 100% approval by secured creditors, only 64.6% of unsecured creditors voted in favour.

Consequently, at the sanction hearing the court was required to consider whether the cross-class cram down mechanism in the restructuring plan should be engaged for the first time in the UK.

On 11 February 2021, the English High Court confirmed in gategroup Guarantee Limited that restructuring plans are insolvency proceedings so are not covered by the Lugano Convention.

One of the debt instruments subject to the gategroup restructuring plan contains an exclusive Swiss court jurisdiction clause. Under the Lugano Convention, proceedings relating to "civil and commercial matters" must generally be brought in the jurisdiction benefitting from the exclusive jurisdiction clause.

In Uralkali v Rowley and another [2020] EWHC 3442 (Ch) – a UK High Court case relating to the administration of a Formula 1 racing team – an unsuccessful bidder for the company's business and assets sued the administrators, arguing that the bid process had been negligently misrepresented and conducted.

The court found that the administrators did not owe a duty of care to the disappointed bidder. It rejected the claimant's criticisms of the company’s sale process and determined that the administrators had conducted it "fairly and properly" and were not, in fact, negligent.

In Uralkali v Rowley and another [2020] EWHC 3442 (Ch) – a UK High Court case relating to the administration of a Formula 1 racing team – an unsuccessful bidder for the company's business and assets sued the administrators, arguing that the bid process had been negligently misrepresented and conducted.

The court found that the administrators did not owe a duty of care to the disappointed bidder. It rejected the claimant's criticisms of the company’s sale process and determined that the administrators had conducted it "fairly and properly" and were not, in fact, negligent.

En todo tipo de procesos y, entre ellos, en los incidentes concursales, la denuncia por la parte demandada de la falta de jurisdicción o de competencia no puede plantearse como una suerte de excepción en la contestación a la demanda o en momento posterior, sino que debe promoverse con carácter previo a la contestación, mediante declinatoria (art. 64.1 Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil [LEC]).

En una nota que redacté ya hace algún tiempo decía que, excepcionalmente, y aunque la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil (LEC) parece excluirlo al disponer que la legitimación activa corresponde a quien aparece en el título como «acreedor» (art. 538.2), ha interpretado la jurisprudencia que puede ser el propio condenado o demandado quien inste la ejecución si tiene interés jurídico en el cumplimiento.

Se exponen brevemente los posibles obstáculos a la ejecución de la resolución (sentencia o decreto del letrado de la Administración de Justicia) que pone fin al procedimiento de liquidación del régimen económico matrimonial de gananciales y se ofrecen los criterios para su superación. 

1.ª ¿Es la sentencia que pone fin al procedimiento con oposición un título ejecutivo?

El artículo 728.1 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil (LEC) regula este presupuesto de las medidas cautelares de una manera flexible, ya que, como ha recordado la jurisprudencia, no requiere (como hacía el Anteproyecto de LEC) que la sentencia condenatoria que en su día se dicte sea «de imposible o muy difícil ejecución», sino que se limita a exigir que puedan producirse situaciones que «impidieren o dificultaren la efectividad de la tutela».

Sin embargo, la jurisprudencia que lo ha interpretado ha sido rigurosa en la delimitación de sus requisitos.

Llamo la atención sobre las dos cuestiones enunciadas, que tienen una indudable relevancia práctica en relación con los recursos extraordinarios: