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From 1 December 2020 onwards, HMRC will be treated as a preferential creditor of companies for certain taxes including PAYE, VAT, employee NICs and Construction Industry Scheme deductions. In the event that a company enters administration or liquidation, HMRC's claim for these taxes will rank ahead of any floating charge holder.

This reflects recent changes made to the Finance Act 2020.

The impact on floating charge holders

On 13 January 2021, the English High Court sanctioned three interconditional Part 26A restructuring plans for the subsidiaries of DeepOcean Group Holding BV.

The plans for two of the companies were approved by the required 75% majority. While the third plan received 100% approval by secured creditors, only 64.6% of unsecured creditors voted in favour.

Consequently, at the sanction hearing the court was required to consider whether the cross-class cram down mechanism in the restructuring plan should be engaged for the first time in the UK.

On 11 February 2021, the English High Court confirmed in gategroup Guarantee Limited that restructuring plans are insolvency proceedings so are not covered by the Lugano Convention.

One of the debt instruments subject to the gategroup restructuring plan contains an exclusive Swiss court jurisdiction clause. Under the Lugano Convention, proceedings relating to "civil and commercial matters" must generally be brought in the jurisdiction benefitting from the exclusive jurisdiction clause.

In Uralkali v Rowley and another [2020] EWHC 3442 (Ch) – a UK High Court case relating to the administration of a Formula 1 racing team – an unsuccessful bidder for the company's business and assets sued the administrators, arguing that the bid process had been negligently misrepresented and conducted.

The court found that the administrators did not owe a duty of care to the disappointed bidder. It rejected the claimant's criticisms of the company’s sale process and determined that the administrators had conducted it "fairly and properly" and were not, in fact, negligent.

In Uralkali v Rowley and another [2020] EWHC 3442 (Ch) – a UK High Court case relating to the administration of a Formula 1 racing team – an unsuccessful bidder for the company's business and assets sued the administrators, arguing that the bid process had been negligently misrepresented and conducted.

The court found that the administrators did not owe a duty of care to the disappointed bidder. It rejected the claimant's criticisms of the company’s sale process and determined that the administrators had conducted it "fairly and properly" and were not, in fact, negligent.

In a decision of first impression entered on June 3, 2020, a Chicago bankruptcy court (“Court”) held that a restaurant tenant was excused from paying a significant portion of its rent under the force majeure provisions of its lease because of the governor’s executive order prohibiting in-house dining during the COVID-19 pandemic.[1] This decision is highly significant for landlords and tenants whose ability to service their clients has similarly been restricted by government orders.

A bankruptcy trustee was “not entitled to avoid” a secured lender’s “lien under the Bankruptcy Code” (“Code”), held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Sept. 11, 2019. In re 180 Equipment, LLC, 2019 WL 4296751, *6 (7th Cir. Sept. 11, 2019). The court rejected the trustee’s argument that the lender’s “lien [was] avoidable because the [lender’s] financing statement failed to properly indicate the secured collateral.” Id., at 1.

Two courts have added to the murky case law addressing a bankruptcy trustee’s ability to recover a debtor’s tuition payments for their children. In Geltzer v. Oberlin College, et al., 2018 WL 6333588 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2018), a New York Bankruptcy Judge permitted a trustee to claw back payments that parents made to their financially independent adult children for college-related costs. In Pergament v. Brooklyn Law School, et al., 2018 WL 6182502 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

We recently wrote about the highly controversial decision of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Fisker Automotive capping a secured creditor’s right to credit bid its $168 million claim at $25 million.[1] The secured creditor immediately appealed to the District Court.[2] As a procedural matter, the secured creditor had an absolute right to have its appeal heard only if the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling was considered a “final order.” If it was not a “final order,” then the District Court had discretion on whether to hear the merits of the appeal. On Feb.