From 1 December 2020 onwards, HMRC will be treated as a preferential creditor of companies for certain taxes including PAYE, VAT, employee NICs and Construction Industry Scheme deductions. In the event that a company enters administration or liquidation, HMRC's claim for these taxes will rank ahead of any floating charge holder.

This reflects recent changes made to the Finance Act 2020.

The impact on floating charge holders

On 13 January 2021, the English High Court sanctioned three interconditional Part 26A restructuring plans for the subsidiaries of DeepOcean Group Holding BV.

The plans for two of the companies were approved by the required 75% majority. While the third plan received 100% approval by secured creditors, only 64.6% of unsecured creditors voted in favour.

Consequently, at the sanction hearing the court was required to consider whether the cross-class cram down mechanism in the restructuring plan should be engaged for the first time in the UK.

On 11 February 2021, the English High Court confirmed in gategroup Guarantee Limited that restructuring plans are insolvency proceedings so are not covered by the Lugano Convention.

One of the debt instruments subject to the gategroup restructuring plan contains an exclusive Swiss court jurisdiction clause. Under the Lugano Convention, proceedings relating to "civil and commercial matters" must generally be brought in the jurisdiction benefitting from the exclusive jurisdiction clause.

In Uralkali v Rowley and another [2020] EWHC 3442 (Ch) – a UK High Court case relating to the administration of a Formula 1 racing team – an unsuccessful bidder for the company's business and assets sued the administrators, arguing that the bid process had been negligently misrepresented and conducted.

The court found that the administrators did not owe a duty of care to the disappointed bidder. It rejected the claimant's criticisms of the company’s sale process and determined that the administrators had conducted it "fairly and properly" and were not, in fact, negligent.

In Uralkali v Rowley and another [2020] EWHC 3442 (Ch) – a UK High Court case relating to the administration of a Formula 1 racing team – an unsuccessful bidder for the company's business and assets sued the administrators, arguing that the bid process had been negligently misrepresented and conducted.

The court found that the administrators did not owe a duty of care to the disappointed bidder. It rejected the claimant's criticisms of the company’s sale process and determined that the administrators had conducted it "fairly and properly" and were not, in fact, negligent.

It has become a common phenomenon that applications are brought to put into business rescue, companies which are already in liquidation – sometimes long after the liquidation commenced.

This raises some interesting questions about whether employees and trade unions remain affected persons for the purposes of such a business rescue application, given that in terms of section 38 of the Insolvency Act (24 of 1936), all employment contracts are deemed to be cancelled within 45 days after the appointment of a final liquidator.

Section 131(6)

It’s an open secret that the commendable goals envisaged by the legislature with the introduction of the business rescue proceedings in Chapter 6 of our Companies Act are being hampered as a result of poorly drafted statutory provisions that govern the business rescue process. Section 141(2)(a)(ii) is however not one of these vague provisions.

There has been considerable controversy about the extent of the powers, and the extent of obligations of a business rescue practitioner in relation to a cession of book debts by the company in rescue.

This is an important issue in business rescue because most financially distressed companies have an overdraft facility with a bank which is secured by a cession of debtors. Many practitioners want or need to use the overdraft facility as working capital.

Cession (generally)

Section 133 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides for a general moratorium on legal proceedings against a company in business rescue.

I wrote an article published in the June issue of Without Prejudice in which this question was considered. I criticised the then binding judgment of Chetty t/a Nationwide Electrical v Hart NO and Another (12559/2012) [20141 ZAKZDHC 9 (25 March 2014), as it was held in that case that arbitration proceedings do not constitute legal proceedings for purposes of section 133 of the Act.

Can a creditor cancel an agreement with a company in business rescue and what is the consequence of a business rescue practitioner suspending an agreement before cancellation?

The lawfulness of cancelling a contract during business rescue