In Mission Product Holdings Inc. v. Tempnology LLC, No. 17-1657, the Supreme Court has held that a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract does not abrogate the rights others enjoy under that contract. Although the Court’s ruling specifically dealt with rights to a trademark license, the reasoning appears broader than that. The Supreme Court has in effect done away with a debtor’s right to reject any lease, concession, license, or agreement and then prevent a counterparty from enjoying the use of the rights previously granted.

The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) recently issued a long-awaited decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic”), which limits the use of “structured dismissals” in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, requiring structured dismissals pursuant to which final distributions are made to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, or the consent of all affected parties to be obtained.1

What is a Structured Dismissal?

Nearly four years after its decision in Stern v. Marshall raised new doubts about the place of bankruptcy courts in our legal system, the Supreme Court has finally put those doubts to rest. This week, in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935, the Court held that even for claims that must otherwise be resolved by an Article III court, a bankruptcy court may still adjudicate the matter based on consent.

The recent reform of the Bankruptcy Act (operated under RD 11/2014 dated September 5, 2014) intended to extend the bankruptcy agreement modifications in favor of the pre-insolvency restructuring and refinancing agreements which were introduced in March 2014.

The reform has a special provision for privileged creditors with warranties subject to specific valuation formulas, to be adjusted to the actual financial value of the guaranteed credit. Any portion of debts that exceed this value will not be considered as privileged, but will be ordinarily classified.

The Spanish Supreme Court has established the legalconcept of insolvency as an objective requirement forthe Declaration of Insolvency pursuant to Section 2.1 ofthe bankruptcy Act by virtue of the decision taken by the Court on April 1, 2014.

The case of Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), No. 12- 1200, was easily one of the most closely watched bankruptcy cases in many years. Last week’s decision in that case, however, was far less dramatic than  some practitioners feared it might be. The Supreme Court answered two important questions regarding the power of bankruptcy courts that it left open three years ago in Stern v. Marshall.

The matter subject to this analysis is decision taken by a Bankruptcy Administration dealing with three companies of the same company group which are involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Given the situation and in response of the confusing information of assets, the Administration under discussion decided to gather the three companies joining all their creditors in a sole debt pooling and besides, joining all the rights and assets of the three companies.  

The object of this article is to analyze a controversial issue which is considered in recent times by the Mercantile Courts as a current incident involved in the Bankruptcy Proceedings and more specifically, to analyze the Judgement issued by the Court of First Instance no. 9 and Mercantile Court of Cordoba dated April, 19th 2010, in which the aforementioned incident is involved.  

This incident is essentially based on establishing the treatment that should be granted to the additional guarantees provided by third parties in bankruptcy proceedings.