In Mission Product Holdings Inc. v. Tempnology LLC, No. 17-1657, the Supreme Court has held that a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract does not abrogate the rights others enjoy under that contract. Although the Court’s ruling specifically dealt with rights to a trademark license, the reasoning appears broader than that. The Supreme Court has in effect done away with a debtor’s right to reject any lease, concession, license, or agreement and then prevent a counterparty from enjoying the use of the rights previously granted.
The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) recently issued a long-awaited decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic”), which limits the use of “structured dismissals” in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, requiring structured dismissals pursuant to which final distributions are made to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, or the consent of all affected parties to be obtained.1
What is a Structured Dismissal?
Nearly four years after its decision in Stern v. Marshall raised new doubts about the place of bankruptcy courts in our legal system, the Supreme Court has finally put those doubts to rest. This week, in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935, the Court held that even for claims that must otherwise be resolved by an Article III court, a bankruptcy court may still adjudicate the matter based on consent.
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (“ISDA”) published the ISDA 2014 Resolution StayProtocol (the “Protocol”) on November 12, 2014 in response to continued efforts by regulators to build additional flexibility into the statutory regimes that would apply in the event of the insolvency of a major financial institution.
The case of Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), No. 12- 1200, was easily one of the most closely watched bankruptcy cases in many years. Last week’s decision in that case, however, was far less dramatic than some practitioners feared it might be. The Supreme Court answered two important questions regarding the power of bankruptcy courts that it left open three years ago in Stern v. Marshall.