Un emprunteur qui, sans en avoir le droit, ne paierait pas l'échéance d'un crédit entre le 12 mars 2020 et l'expiration d'un délai d'un mois à compter de la date de cessation de l'état d'urgence sanitaire (lui-même censé durer deux mois à compter du 24 mars 2020 sauf report), pourrait arguer que la clause d'exigibilité anticipée du crédit et la clause d'intérêts de retard (une clause pénale) ne pourront produire leurs effets qu'à compter de l'expiration de cette période en application de l'ordonnance n° 2020-306 du 25 mars 2020 prise en application de la loi d'urgence n° 2020-290 du 23 mars

A borrower who, without having the right to do so, would not pay a credit instalment due between 12 March 2020 and one month after the end of the state of health emergency (which is supposed to last two months as from 24 March 2020 but could be extended), could argue that the loan documents' acceleration clause and default interest clause (a liquidated damage clause) shall only take effect after that period pursuant to Ordinance No. 2020-306 of 25 March 2020, adopted further to the "emergency" Law No. 2020-290 of 23 March 2020.

A borrower who, without having the right to do so, would not pay a credit instalment due between 12 March 2020 and one month after the end of the state of health emergency (which is supposed to last two months as from 24 March 2020 but could be extended), could argue that the loan documents' acceleration clause and default interest clause (a liquidated damage clause) shall only take effect after that period pursuant to Ordinance No. 2020-306 of 25 March 2020, adopted further to the "emergency" Law No. 2020-290 of 23 March 2020.

In a brief but significant opinion, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware reversed a decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware and allowed more than $30 million in unsecured, post-petition fees incurred by an indenture trustee ("Indenture Trustee").1 In reversing, the District Court relied upon a uniform body of Court of Appeals opinions issued on the subject.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

A Chapter 11 debtor “cannot nullify a preexisting obligation in a loan agreement to pay post-default interest solely by proposing a cure,” held a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 4, 2016. In re New Investments Inc., 2016 WL 6543520, *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2016) (2-1).

While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

An asset purchaser’s payments into segregated accounts for the benefit of general unsecured creditors and professionals employed by the debtor (i.e., the seller) and its creditors’ committee, made in connection with the purchase of all of the debtor’s assets, are not property of the debtor’s estate or available for distribution to creditors according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit — even when some of the segregated accounts were listed as consideration in the governing asset purchase agreement. ICL Holding Company, Inc., et al. v.

Bankruptcy courts may hear state law disputes “when the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 2015. Wellness Int’l Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 2015 WL 2456619, at *3 (May 26, 2015). That consent, moreover, need not be express, reasoned the Court. Id. at *9 (“Nothing in the Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be express.”). Reversing the U.S.