The United States Bankruptcy Code, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 502(b)(6), caps a landlord's claim in bankruptcy for damages resulting from the termination of a real property lease. See In re PPI EnterprisesU.S., 324 F.3d 197, 207 (3rd Cir. 2003). Under Section 502(b)(6), a landlord-creditor is entitled to rent reserve from the greater of one lease year or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of the remaining lease term.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, (“the Court”) held in In re John Joseph Louis Johnson, III, Case No. 14-57104, 2016 WL 1719149, that a creditor violated the automatic stay by seeking to enforce an arbitration award against nondebtor co-defendants. The automatic stay applies not only to stay actions against the debtor personally but also prohibits “any act to … exercise control over property of the [debtor’s bankruptcy] estate.” 11 U.S.C.
On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it. The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Tribune Co.
The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. [1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.
Background
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.
In In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., No. 14-24287 (Bankr. D.N.J., Oct. 31, 2014), Judge Michael B. Kaplan of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey held that trademark licenses may be entitled, under a bankruptcy court's equitable powers, to the protections of Section 365(n) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
On October 31, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Kaplan of the District of New Jersey addressed two issues critically important to intellectual property licensees and purchasers: (i) can a trademark licensee use section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to keep licensed marks following a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement?; and (ii) can a “free and clear” sale of intellectual property eliminate any rights retained by a licensee? In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., et al., 2014 WL 5508177 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014).
In Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, petitioner vs. Peter H. Arkison, Chapter 7 Trustee, Case No. 12-1200, 573 U.S. __(2014) the United States Supreme Court ( Court) delivered its opinion as a follow up to its landmark decision in Stern v. Marshall. In Stern v.
Earlier this year, we reported on a decision limiting a secured creditor's right to credit bid purchased debt (capping the credit bid at the discounted price paid for the debt) to facilitate an auction in Fisker Automotive Holdings' chapter 11 case.1 In the weeks that followed, the debtor held a competitive (nineteen-round) auction and ultimately selected Wanxiang America Corporation, rather than the secured creditor, as the w
In AMR Corporation, et al., Debtors, Case No. 12-3967, 2013 WL 1339123 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 2013), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York acknowledged that to be granted relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), a secured creditor has the initial burden to show that there has been a decline—or at least a risk of decline—in the value of its collateral. Only then will the burden shift to the debtor to prove that the value of the collateral is not, in fact, declining.