Recently, in In re Tribune Company, the Third Circuit affirmed that the Bankruptcy Code means exactly what it says and that the enforcement of subordination agreements can be abridged when cramming down confirmation of a chapter 11 plan over a rejecting class entitled to the benefit of the subordination agreement, so long as doing so does not “unfairly discriminate” against the rejecting class (and the other requirements for a cramdown are satisfied).
Analyzing the inner workings of the elements required for the securities contract “safe harbor” protection under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court for the SDNY dismissed a complaint seeking to recover approximately US$1 billion in allegedly fraudulent transfers brought against various transferees as part of the Boston Generating Chapter 11 case.
No, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Maxus Energy Corp. In Maxus, the defendant, Vista Analytical Laboratory, Inc. (“Vista” or the “Defendant”), a designated critical vendor, sought summary judgement dismissing the preference complaint. The Court denied summary judgement finding that the critical vendor status did not per se insulate Vista from preference actions.
Background
It is well established that by filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy, a creditor submits itself to the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and waives any right it would otherwise have to a jury trial with respect to any issue that “bears directly on the allowance of its claim.” Such a waiver normally applies in fraudulent transfer actions, since under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code the court must disallow a claim of any entity that received an avoidable transfer.
In a recent bench ruling, the Delaware bankruptcy court denied a motion to dismiss a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, notwithstanding the fact that the filing contravened an express bankruptcy-filing blocking right, or “golden share,” held by certain preferred shareholders.
Two courts recently answered “yes,” finding that environmental claims brought against reorganized debtors by government entities were discharged under confirmed Chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In In re Exide Techs., 613 B.R. 79 (D. Del. 2020), the District of Delaware held that pre-petition, non-compensatory air quality penalties imposed on a Chapter 11 debtor by a state regulator were subject to discharge in bankruptcy. And in In re Peabody Energy Corp.
I.Exide Techs.: the Bankruptcy Code’s Exceptions to Dischargeability
Yes, says the First Circuit. The First Circuit recently affirmed the District Court’s decision to deny a group of bondholders’ (the “Bondholders”) motion to have a trustee appointed for the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “System”) under section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a court to appoint a trustee to pursue avoidance actions in Chapter 9 cases.
Disagreeing with the much-critiqued SDNY opinion in Enron, the SDNY bankruptcy court disallowed claims brought by secondary transferees because the original claimants allegedly received millions of dollars in fraudulent transfers and preferences from the Debtors that have not been repaid. Deepening the district spilt on the nature of Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that the defense barring fraudulent transfer-tainted claims focuses on claims—not claimants—and cannot be “washed clean” by a subsequent transfer in the secondary market.
Parts I and II in this series discussed certain of the statutory predicates of credit bidding and some considerations for structuring such a bid. Here in Part III, we will address some additional issues that a lender must take into account when deciding to credit bid its debt and some documentary considerations. As its name implies, the predominant form of consideration in a credit bid is often the lender’s debt. Lenders, however, cannot ignore another component of consideration often needed to consummate a transaction, cash.
In Part I of this three part series we noted the likelihood that credit bidding will be more prevalent in today’s unpredictable economic environment and discussed some of the statutory backdrop. Here, in Part II, we will discuss certain mechanics that are associated with making, and later consummating, a credit bid.