A real, as opposed to remote, risk of insolvency is not necessarily enough for the duties of a board of directors to switch from being owed to its shareholders to being owed to its creditors.

In a matter of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York recently analyzed whether a debtor may exempt from her bankruptcy estate a retirement account that was bequeathed to her upon the death of her parent. In In re Todd, 585 B.R. 297 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y 2018), the court addressed an objection to a debtor’s claim of exemption in an inherited retirement account, and held that the property was not exempt under New York and federal law.

In Kaye v. Blue Bell Creameries (In re BFW Liquidation), 899 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that a liability for an allegedly preferential transfer may be reduced by the amount of new value given, regardless of whether that new value has already been repaid by the debtor before its bankruptcy filing.

On June 4, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lamar Archer & Cofrin LLP v. Appling,[1] resolving a circuit split on the issue of whether a debtor’s statement about a single asset constitutes “a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).

Alerts and Updates

The Supreme Court’s opinion is significant because it will encourage creditors to rely on written, rather than oral, statements of debtors as to both their assets and overall financial status, which are better evidence in a nondischargeability case.

In a recent decision out of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia, a court analyzed the effect of a setoff effectuated between two governmental units in the 90 days prior to the filing of a husband and wife’s bankruptcy case. In Hurt v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (In re Hurt), 579 B.R. 765 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2017), the court addressed competing motions for summary judgment filed by the debtors, on the one hand, and the U.S.

We closed the first quarter of 2018 following a period of intense scrutiny on the restructuring and insolvency profession. The stress in the retail and dining sectors, the increase in CVAs and the various attendances of stakeholders in the profession before Select Committees has been the forerunner to two consultation papers.

To a layperson this may came as a surprise. But, to those familiar with the secondary loan market, it is confirmation of existing law.

A “vulture fund”– including a newly incorporated company with a share capital of only £1 that has not traded and has been established for the purpose of acquiring a defaulted loan with a view to realising more by enforcing than had been expended on acquiring the debt can be a “financial institution” for the purposes of the transfer provisions of a loan agreement.

Since May 2002, we have had a regime which ensures that an insolvency proceeding started in one of the EU’s member states is, without further formality, recognised in all other member states (except for Denmark) and which determines the law applicable to such proceedings. That regime is provided for in the EU Regulation on insolvency proceedings (1346/2000/EC) (the EIR).

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding, 580 U.S. __(2017), decided on March 22, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, without the consent of impaired creditors, a bankruptcy court cannot approve a "structured dismissal" that provides for distributions deviating from the ordinary priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. The ruling reverses the decisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, and the U.S.