On March 27, the president signed into law Phase 3 of the federal stimulus program, called the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, or CARES Act. Title I of the act, titled the Keeping American Workers Paid and Employed Act (KAWPEA), directs, among other amounts, $349 billion to small businesses as part of an expansion of the U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Section 7(a) loan program under a new paycheck protection loan program (PPP) as well as $10 billion through an expansion to the SBA’s Section 7(b) economic injury disaster loan (EIDL) program.

The question is not if but how deeply the global coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic will disrupt businesses and impact future operations. That answer differs based upon each company’s industry, access to cash and other capital, debt structure, ability to manage expenses, lost revenues, and operational interruption. Certain industries, such as airlines and airline service companies, hotels, restaurants, sports and entertainment, media, and retailers, among others, are suffering immediate adverse effects. Our healthcare resources are being stretched thin.

The recent decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in In re AAGS Holdings LLC, Case No. 19-13029 (SMB) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 12, 2019), underscores the ability of debtors — and specifically, for purposes of this Client Alert, parties to real property purchase contracts — to take advantage of the Bankruptcy Code’s 60-day tolling period to get more time to close on a purchase despite a “time of the essence” ("TOE") closing deadline.

In a matter of first impression, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York recently analyzed whether a debtor may exempt from her bankruptcy estate a retirement account that was bequeathed to her upon the death of her parent. In In re Todd, 585 B.R. 297 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y 2018), the court addressed an objection to a debtor’s claim of exemption in an inherited retirement account, and held that the property was not exempt under New York and federal law.

In Kaye v. Blue Bell Creameries (In re BFW Liquidation), 899 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that a liability for an allegedly preferential transfer may be reduced by the amount of new value given, regardless of whether that new value has already been repaid by the debtor before its bankruptcy filing.

On June 4, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lamar Archer & Cofrin LLP v. Appling,[1] resolving a circuit split on the issue of whether a debtor’s statement about a single asset constitutes “a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).

Alerts and Updates

The Supreme Court’s opinion is significant because it will encourage creditors to rely on written, rather than oral, statements of debtors as to both their assets and overall financial status, which are better evidence in a nondischargeability case.

In a recent decision out of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia, a court analyzed the effect of a setoff effectuated between two governmental units in the 90 days prior to the filing of a husband and wife’s bankruptcy case. In Hurt v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (In re Hurt), 579 B.R. 765 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2017), the court addressed competing motions for summary judgment filed by the debtors, on the one hand, and the U.S.

In another decision affecting Chapter 11 cases, U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge, --- S. Ct. ---, 2018 WL 1143822 (2018), on March 5, 2018, the United States Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Kagan, affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision to review the Bankruptcy Court’s determination of a mixed question of fact and law for clear error, rather than de novo.

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding, 580 U.S. __(2017), decided on March 22, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, without the consent of impaired creditors, a bankruptcy court cannot approve a "structured dismissal" that provides for distributions deviating from the ordinary priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. The ruling reverses the decisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, and the U.S.