2018 has seen a wave of company voluntary arrangements ("CVAs") hit the market, with high profile companies such as House of Fraser, Carpetright, New Look and Homebase (to name a few) all making use of this restructuring tool. This briefing note explains how a CVA works, provides an overview of current "market" themes, and makes some predictions on the future of CVAs.

EVOLUTION OF THE CVA

2018 has seen a wave of company voluntary arrangements ("CVAs") hit the market, with high profile companies such as House of Fraser, Carpetright, New Look and Homebase (to name a few) all making use of this restructuring tool. This briefing note explains how a CVA works, provides an overview of current "market" themes, and makes some predictions on the future of CVAs

EVOLUTION OF THE CVA

In Kaye v. Blue Bell Creameries (In re BFW Liquidation), 899 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that a liability for an allegedly preferential transfer may be reduced by the amount of new value given, regardless of whether that new value has already been repaid by the debtor before its bankruptcy filing.

On June 4, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lamar Archer & Cofrin LLP v. Appling,[1] resolving a circuit split on the issue of whether a debtor’s statement about a single asset constitutes “a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).

Alerts and Updates

The Supreme Court’s opinion is significant because it will encourage creditors to rely on written, rather than oral, statements of debtors as to both their assets and overall financial status, which are better evidence in a nondischargeability case.

In a recent decision out of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia, a court analyzed the effect of a setoff effectuated between two governmental units in the 90 days prior to the filing of a husband and wife’s bankruptcy case. In Hurt v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (In re Hurt), 579 B.R. 765 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2017), the court addressed competing motions for summary judgment filed by the debtors, on the one hand, and the U.S.

SAW (SW) 2010 Ltd & Anor v Wilson & Ors [2017] EWCA Cif 1001 (25 July 2017)

The Court of Appeal has held that the validity of a floating charge (and the appointment of joint administrators under that floating charge pursuant to paragraph 14 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986) does not depend on the existence of uncharged assets of the company at the time of its creation, nor upon the power of the company to acquire assets in the future.

BACKGROUND

Randhawa & Anor v Turpin & Anor [2017] EWCA Civ 1201

In a fascinating (and very readable) judgment, the Court of Appeal has held the appointment of joint administrators made under paragraph 22 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 ("IA 1986") to be invalid because, among other things, the appointment was made following an inquourate board meeting. Readers are encouraged to read the judgment, as the following is merely an overview of the facts and conclusions.

BACKGROUND

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding, 580 U.S. __(2017), decided on March 22, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, without the consent of impaired creditors, a bankruptcy court cannot approve a "structured dismissal" that provides for distributions deviating from the ordinary priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. The ruling reverses the decisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, and the U.S.

The immediate effect of Jevic will be that practitioners may no longer structure dismissals in any manner that deviates from the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code without the consent of impaired creditors.