Borrowers are increasingly seeking to challenge or frustrate the validity of an appointment of a receiver on technical grounds. While each case will be determined on its own merits and facts, a recent decision of the High Court is illustrative of the Court’s attitude towards some such arguments.
A number of recent High Court decisions suggest an increase in the number of interlocutory applications being brought by receivers seeking to obtain vacant possession of the properties over which they have been appointed.
In Morning Mist Holdings Limited v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Limited), Case No. 11-4376, 2013 WL 1593348 (2d Cir.
In In re Kerr Aluminium Ltd (In Voluntary Liquidation) [2012] IEHC 386, the High Court dismissed an application by a liquidator that certain payments made by the company in favour of Bank of Ireland be deemed a fraudulent preference within the meaning of section 286 of the Companies Act 1963. The decision is a further reminder of the challenges liquidators face in establishing a dominant intention to prefer one creditor over another in fraudulent preference applications.
An application by Quinn family members to have court-appointed receivers removed and their solicitors discharged on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest and partiality has been dismissed by the Commercial Court.
In a recent High Court case, a liquidator sought an order declaring that certain payments made by a company prior to its liquidation were a ‘fraudulent preference’ and invalid. The company had made payments to its overdrawn bank account which was personally guaranteed by one of its directors. It was alleged that the payments were made in order to reduce the company’s overdraft and therefore, the director’s own personal exposure under the guarantees.
In a corporate system based in part on the separation of ownership and control, the relationship between principals and agents is riddled with agency problems: Among them are potential conflicts of interest where agents may abuse their fiduciary position for their own benefit as opposed to the benefit of the principals to whom they are obligated. Delineating the agents' fiduciary duties is thus a central focus of corporate law, and the dereliction of those duties often comes under scrutiny in the bankruptcy context.
The term “pre-pack”, as it relates to insolvency sales, can have different meanings in different jurisdictions. In essence it refers to a sale of a distressed company or asset where the purchaser or investor has been identified and the terms of the sale have been fully negotiated before an insolvency process occurs. The advantage to the “pre-pack” structure is that the sale can be completed immediately upon or closely after the appointment of the insolvency office holder and, critically, without material interruption to the trading activity of the target company or asset.
Once a company has entered into a formal insolvency process, all its assets must be realised and distributed in accordance with the Companies Acts. An attempt to prefer a particular creditor up to two years prior to an insolvent liquidation can be declared void by the courts on the application of the liquidator of the insolvent company. To succeed on such an application, however, the liquidator must prove that the dominant intention of the insolvent company at the time it entered into the transaction was to prefer the creditor in question.