On January 15, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) held in In re Trump Entertainment Resorts that section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to reject an expired collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).
On Aug. 4, 2015, in City of Concord, New Hampshire v. Northern New England Telephone Operations LLC (In re Northern New England Telephone Operations LLC), No. 14-3381 (2nd Cir. Aug. 4, 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the circumstances under which a creditor's lien on the property of a debtor may be extinguished through a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.
On November 5, 2015, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California issued a “Memorandum re Plan Confirmation” in In re Bowie, Case No. 15-10144 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov.
Pursuant to Section 727 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, an individual Chapter 7 debtor may receive a discharge "from all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief under this chapter." A Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 debtor may receive similar relief pursuant to Sections 1141 and 1328(b), respectively. Under any chapter, this discharge serves the Bankruptcy Code's principal goal of relieving a debtor from his or her prepetition obligations and providing the debtor with a "fresh start" on emergence from bankruptcy.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), a secured party can perfect its lien on certain of a debtor's assets by the filing of a UCC-1 financing statement. However, Section 9-509 of the UCC provides that a party may file such a financing statement only if the debtor authorizes the filing: either expressly in an authenticated record or, more commonly, by executing a security agreement. The UCC does not specify when a debtor must provide such authorization, but the U.S.
Compensation for bankruptcy professionals employed in bankruptcy cases is governed by Section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 330(a)(1) of the code provides, in pertinent part, that "the court may award to ... a professional person employed under Section 327 or 1103—(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered." Professionals whose employment is approved by the bankruptcy court consequently must file fee applications, to be reviewed and approved by the court for work performed in the bankruptcy case.
On Jan. 21, in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation v. JPMorgan Chase Bank (In re Motors Liquidation), No. 13-2187, (2d Cir. Jan. 21, 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether a UCC-3 termination statement, which was improperly filed as part of the repayment of an unrelated loan, may be considered effective to terminate the security interest in question, even where none of the parties intended that result.
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) affirmed the order of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.) approving a settlement and dismissal of a chapter 11 case by way of a “structured dismissal.” A structured dismissal is, simply, the dismissal of the bankruptcy case preceded by other orders, such as an order approving a settlement or granting releases, which survive dismissal of the case.
Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code provides creditors with a mechanism to force a recalcitrant debtor into bankruptcy through the filing of an involuntary petition for relief. Pursuant to this section, an involuntary bankruptcy case may be commenced only under Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and may only be brought against a person otherwise qualified to file a voluntary petition. Where the purported debtor has fewer than 12 creditors, the involuntary petition need only be filed by a single creditor.
On May 4, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the order of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dismissing the appeal of chapter 13 debtor Luis Bullard for lack of jurisdiction.1 The Court held that the order of the Bankruptcy Court denying confirmation of Bullard’s proposed chapter 13 plan was not a final order from which Bullard could immediately appeal as of right.2 The Court reasoned that, while confirmation of a plan can be said to fix the rights and obligations of the parties in a way that alters the status quo, d