The Bankruptcy Protector

The Bankruptcy Protector

Imagine this: you sell a product to a company on credit at 8% interest until you are paid, and the company files for bankruptcy before repayment. Or maybe you are a hard money lender that made an unsecured loan at 18% to a company to bridge through hard times, and the company files for bankruptcy. Or maybe you are a secured creditor with a 5% loan on real estate, and after the borrower files for bankruptcy, you discover there is a defect in your mortgage and your lien can be stripped.

A person in possession of a debtor’s property upon a bankruptcy filing now has more guidance from the Supreme Court as to the effect of the automatic stay. In City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021), handed down on January 14 of 2021, the Court was faced with the issue of whether the City of Chicago (the “City”) was liable for violation of the automatic stay for refusing to return vehicles it impounded pre-petition. Issuing a narrow decision under Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that it was not.

Payment Orders were originally introduced in the CPC as a fast track route for creditors holding a financial instrument, such as a letter of credit or cheque, to obtain judgment against their debtor for what is a simple and indisputable debt. Payment Orders were rarely issued by the onshore UAE courts. In 2018, Cabinet Resolution No 57 of 2018 (the “2018 Cabinet Resolution”) significantly expanded the scope of application of Payment Orders by extending them to all admitted debts rather than simply those arising out of financial instruments only.

In Shameeka Ien v. TransCare Corp., et al. (In re TransCareCorp.), Case No. 16-10407, Adv. P. No. 16-01033 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2020) [D.I. 157], the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently refused to dismiss WARN Act claims against Patriarch Partners, LLC, private equity firm (“PE Firm“), and its owner, Lynn Tilton (“PE Owner“), resulting from the staggered chapter 7 bankruptcies of several portfolio companies, TransCare Corporation and its affiliates (collectively, the “Debtors“).

Joining three other bankruptcy courts, Judge Thuma of the District of New Mexico recently held that the rules issued by the Small Business Administration (“SBA“) that restrict bankrupt entities from participating in the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP“) violated the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, H.R. 748, P.L. 115-136 (the “CARES Act”), as well as section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The Southern District of New York recently reminded us in In re Firestar Diamond, Inc., et al., Case No. 18-10509 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 22, 2019) (SHL) [Dkt. No. 1482] that equitable principles in bankruptcy often do not match those outside of bankruptcy. Indeed, bankruptcy decisions often place emphasis on equality of treatment amongst all creditors and are less concerned with inequities to individual creditors.

Introduction

In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., f/b/o Jerome Guyant, IRA v. Highland Construction Management Services, L.P. et al., Nos. 18-2450-52 (4th Cir. March 17, 2020), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld that a borrower’s indirect economic interests in a limited liability company (LLC) were not assigned to a lender under a conveyance in a security agreement assigning mere membership interests, pursuant to Virginia state law.

Facts

Setoff is a right that allows a creditor to offset a prepetition debt owed to a debtor with its prepetition claim against the debtor.  See In re Luongo, 259 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir.