On 1 November 2023, the Supreme Court has overturned the 2021 Divisional Court judgment in R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates Court and another to hold that administrators do not fall within the meaning of a "director, manager, secretary or similar officer of the company" under s194(3) the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULCRA 1992).

When a debtor files for bankruptcy, it’s axiomatic that all creditors, wherever located, must immediately cease their efforts to collect on debts owed to them by that debtor, right? Not necessarily so, says the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, insofar as those creditors and their collateral are located outside of the United States.

The Bankruptcy Protector

Envision a scenario in which you purchased a right of first refusal for a parcel of real estate. That right, as bargained for, would let you purchase the parcel if it was put up for sale by matching any competing bidder’s offer. As a diligent prospective purchaser, you would naturally record that right of first refusal in the appropriate land records. So far so good.

Criminal prosecutions for administrators are rare, and rarer still are prosecutions under employment legislation. However, a recent decision has confirmed that an administrator can be prosecuted and personally liable for a failure to notify the Secretary of State of proposed collective redundancies under the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA).

A person in possession of a debtor’s property upon a bankruptcy filing now has more guidance from the Supreme Court as to the effect of the automatic stay. In City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021), handed down on January 14 of 2021, the Court was faced with the issue of whether the City of Chicago (the “City”) was liable for violation of the automatic stay for refusing to return vehicles it impounded pre-petition. Issuing a narrow decision under Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that it was not.

In bankruptcy as in federal jurisprudence generally, to characterize something with the near-epithet of “federal common law” virtually dooms it to rejection.

In January 2020 we reported that, after the reconsideration suggested by two Supreme Court justices and revisions to account for the Supreme Court’s Merit Management decision,[1] the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stood by its origina

It seems to be a common misunderstanding, even among lawyers who are not bankruptcy lawyers, that litigation in federal bankruptcy court consists largely or even exclusively of disputes about the avoidance of transactions as preferential or fraudulent, the allowance of claims and the confirmation of plans of reorganization. However, with a jurisdictional reach that encompasses “all civil proceedings . . .

I don’t know if Congress foresaw, when it enacted new Subchapter V of Chapter 11 of the Code[1] in the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), that debtors in pending cases would seek to convert or redesignate their cases as Subchapter V cases when SBRA became effective on February 19, 2020, but it was foreseeable.

Our February 26 post [1] reported on the first case dealing with the question whether a debtor in a pending Chapter 11 case may redesignate it as a case under Subchapter V, [2] the new subchapter of Chapter 11 adopted by the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 (“SBRA”), which became effective on February 19.