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In an opinion issued on Sept. 20 by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico, Judge David T. Thuma held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not prevent a bankruptcy court from determining whether the automatic stay applies to pending state court litigation. See In re Shook, Case No. 24-10724-t7 (Bankr. N.M. Sept. 20, 2024) [ECF No. 54].

Disagreement regarding the interpretation of section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code has led to divergent rulings among the bankruptcy and federal circuit courts regarding whether a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor can assume an executory contract or unexpired lease that is unassignable under applicable non-bankruptcy law without the counterparty's consent—even where the debtor has no intention of assigning the agreement to a third party.

The Bankruptcy Code provides that, in chapter 11 cases where the court does not find "cause" for the appointment of a trustee, the court "shall" appoint an examiner, upon a request from the Office of the U.S. Trustee (the "UST") or any party-in-interest prior to confirmation of a chapter 11 plan. The examiner's role is to investigate the debtor's affairs or allegations of management misconduct, if either: (i) the court determines that the appointment would be in the best interests of stakeholders and the estate; or (ii) the debtor has qualifying unsecured debt exceeding $5 million.

Section 1124(2) of the Bankruptcy Code gives chapter 11 debtors a valuable tool for use in situations where long-term prepetition debt carries a significantly lower interest rate than the rates available at the time of emergence from bankruptcy. Under this section, in a chapter 11 plan, the debtor can "cure" any defaults under the relevant agreement and "reinstate" the maturity date and other terms of the original agreement, thus enabling the debtor to "lock in" a favorable interest rate in a prepetition loan agreement upon bankruptcy emergence.

In Matter of Imperial Petroleum Recovery Corp., 84 F.4th 264 (5th Cir. 2023), the Fifth Circuit was asked to address whether 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) – the federal statute providing for post-judgment interest – applies in adversary proceedings even though 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) doesn’t explicitly refer to bankruptcy courts.

On June 6, 2023, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas confirmed the chapter 11 plan of bedding manufacturer Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC and its affiliates (collectively, "Serta"). In confirming Serta's plan, the court held that a 2020 "uptier," or "position enhancement," transaction (the "2020 Transaction") whereby Serta issued new debt secured by a priming lien on its assets and purchased its existing debt from participating lenders at a discount with a portion of the proceeds did not violate the terms of Serta's 2016 credit agreement.

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions to creditors in a "structured dismissal" of a chapter 11 case that violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules without the consent of creditors. However, because the Court declined to express any "view about the legality of structured dismissals in general," many open questions remain regarding the structured dismissal mechanism.

In Matter of Texxon Petrochemicals, L.L.C., 67 F.4th 259 (5th Cir. 2023), the Fifth Circuit held that even if an appeal is equitably moot, the appellate court nonetheless has appellate jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal, without reaching the issue of equitable mootness.

Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the reversal or modification of an order approving a sale or lease of assets in bankruptcy does not affect the validity of the sale or lease to a good-faith purchaser or lessee unless the party challenging the sale or lease obtains a stay pending its appeal of the order.