In March, we reported on a brief filed by the Solicitor General recommending denial of a petition for certiorari filed by Tribune creditors seeking Supreme Court review of the Second Circuit ruling dismissing their state-law fraudulent transfer claims.

A discharge of debt in bankruptcy “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). Certain debts, however, including debts “for violation of . . . any of the State securities laws,” are not subject to discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). A discharge injunction does not bar the collection of such debts.

The Bankruptcy Protector

In City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton, No. 19-357, 2021 WL 125106, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2021), the United States Supreme Court considered the issue of whether the mere retention of estate property after the filing of a bankruptcy petition violates section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. Reversing the Seventh Circuit and resolving a split among the circuits, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously on January 14, 2021 “that mere retention of property does not violate the [automatic stay in] § 362(a)(3).”

We have blogged previously about section 546(e), the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor for certain transfers otherwise subject to avoidance as preferences or fraudulent transfers. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e). Among the transfers protected by the section 546(e) safe harbor are transfers by or to a “financial participant” made “in connection with a securities contract.” Id.

The Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. These avoidance powers are subject to certain limitations, including a safe harbor in section 546(e) exempting certain transfers. Among other things, section 546(e) bars avoidance of a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . .

Last February, we blogged about the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Energy Future Holdings Corp, No. 19-1430, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 4947 (Feb. 18, 2020). The Third Circuit approved a process for resolving asbestos claims in which a bar date was imposed on filing the claims, but late claimants who were unaware of their asbestos claims would be allowed to have the bar date excused through Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3). (A bar date is a date set by the court by which all claims against the debtor must be filed.

Bankruptcy experts are applauding a proposed change to the Paycheck Protection Program that will allow small business debtors to access loans under federal COVID-19 relief packages, correcting what they say was a mistake in early versions of the aid program that left bankrupt companies without a valuable tool for surviving the pandemic.

On June 22, U.S. Circuit Judge Judge Jerry Smith issued a short, three-page opinion in the case Hidalgo County Emergency Service Foundation v. Carranza that appeared, at first blush, to be a death blow to many debtors' ability to obtain Paycheck Protection Program, or PPP, loans under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security, or CARES, Act.

Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, when a transfer is avoided under one of several other sections of the Code, a trustee may recover “the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property” from “the initial transferee of such transfer,” “the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made,” or “any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.” 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).

In Lane v. Bank of New York Mellon (In re Lane), No. 18-60059, 2020 WL 2832270 (9th Cir. June 1, 2020), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was asked to decide whether a bankruptcy court may void a lien under section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code when a claim relating to the lien is disallowed because the creditor who filed the proof of claim did not prove that it was the person entitled to enforce the debt the lien secures. Employing a narrow reading of section 506(d), the Ninth Circuit answered the question in the negative.