Introduction

In an opinion issued on Sept. 20 by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico, Judge David T. Thuma held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not prevent a bankruptcy court from determining whether the automatic stay applies to pending state court litigation. See In re Shook, Case No. 24-10724-t7 (Bankr. N.M. Sept. 20, 2024) [ECF No. 54].

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.

We have previously blogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548. Section 546(e), however, bars avoiding certain transfers, including a “settlement payment . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . . a financial institution [or] a transfer made by or to (or for the benefit of) a . . . financial institution . . . in connection with a securities contract.” 11 U.S.C. § 546(e).

In Matter of Imperial Petroleum Recovery Corp., 84 F.4th 264 (5th Cir. 2023), the Fifth Circuit was asked to address whether 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) – the federal statute providing for post-judgment interest – applies in adversary proceedings even though 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) doesn’t explicitly refer to bankruptcy courts.

Federal law assigns to U.S. district courts original jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) and all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in or relating to Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b). Federal law permits each U.S. district court to refer such cases and civil proceedings to bankruptcy courts, and district courts generally do so. But bankruptcy courts, unlike district courts, are not courts under Article III of the Constitution, and are therefore constrained in what powers they may constitutionally exercise.

In earlier posts, the Red Zone has discussed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 142 S. Ct. 1770 (2022), which held that increased U.S.

Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code enables a trustee to step into the shoes of a creditor and avoid a transfer “of an interest of the debtor in property” that an unsecured creditor could avoid under applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1). Thus, for example, if outside of bankruptcy a creditor could avoid a transaction entered by a debtor as a fraudulent transfer, in bankruptcy, the trustee acquires the power to avoid such a transaction.

On 17 July 2023, the Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered its judgement in Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Raman Ispat Private Limited & Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 842 (Raman Ispat). The specific issue of whether Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. (Appellant) could enforce a security interest created over the assets of Raman Ispat Private Limited (Corporate Debtor) outside of the liquidation proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code) was settled in the negative. More importantly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court confined the applicability of State Tax Officer v.